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Long-Term Care Hospitals (LTCHs) have emerged as an important alternative
to traditional settings for post-acute care (PAC), such as skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs) and inpatient rehabilitation hospitals (IRFs). LTCHs are accredited acute
care hospitals and are designed to provide extensive medical and rehabilitative care
to chronic, critically ill patients. Hospitals qualify as LTCHs under the Medicare pro-
gram if they maintain an average length of stay above 25 days among their Medicare
patients. Most LTCH patients are admitted from other health care institutions and
often come from intensive care units (ICUs) in acute hospitals. These patients tend
to have long acute and post-acute stays and suffer from complex medical conditions.
LTCHs have historically played a fairly minor role in the health care system, but in
recent years have grown in market share, in share of Medicare outlays, and in the
sheer number of facilities. The number of LTCHs nearly doubled between 1996 and
2004, and Medicare outlays to LTCHs grew 18% annually from 1996 to 2005, far
outpacing growth in outlays to SNFs and IRFs. In 2004, Medicare paid $3.8 billion
to the 353 operating LTCHs for care provided during more than 122,000 episodes
[29]. In that year, LTCHs were operating in 42 states.
Like conventional PAC providers, demand for LTCH care has flourished since
1
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the introduction of Medicare prospective payment system for acute care hospitals
because the site of care has shifted away from acute hospitals. Until 1984, the
Medicare program paid all providers, acute and post-acute, on a retrospective cost
basis; under this system, payment incentives had little effect on where services were
performed. With the introduction of the acute hospital prospective payment system,
however, the Medicare program gave acute hospitals the incentive to provide shorter
stays and discharge patients either to home or to institutional PAC settings earlier
than had been the case under cost-based reimbursement. This change in payment
incentives, coupled with changes in medical technology and changes in Medicare
coverage of PAC services, enabled and encouraged a shift in the site of care from the
inpatient setting to post-acute settings [6]. Whereas demand for conventional PAC
grew out a need for cost-effective and less intense alternatives to hospital care in
general, LTCHs grew out of demand for specialized post-acute services. The modern
LTCH emerged in the 1980s as an alternative provider to ICUs in treating long
staying, difficult to wean mechanically ventilated patients. Over time LTCHs became
a setting where many different types of chronic, critically ill patients could be treated
in lieu of prolonged acute hospital stays. LTCHs expanded their treatment focus to
include specialization in rehabilitative and mental care, in addition to respiratory
care [22].
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the market behavior of LTCHs,
to examine payment system incentives in post-acute care, and to study substitution
between LTCHs and other PAC providers. This work focuses on three specific ques-
tions. First, are LTCHs similar to other PAC providers in the patients they treat
and the services they provide, and is regional variation in LTCHs’ location related to
regional variation in health needs? Second, does the eligibility criterion (that LTCHs
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maintain at least 25 average length of stay) alter how LTCHs change their practice
patterns under prospective payment? Finally, do SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs substitute
well for each other in the care of prolonged mechanically ventilated patients? In
studying these questions, this dissertation addresses some of the gaps in our current
understanding of LTCH patients, operations and outcomes.
Recent work has shown the class of LTCHs to be very heterogeneous in their
structural characteristics, practice patterns, and patient caseloads. Patients treated
in LTCHs span broad classes of diagnoses [22]. Like other PAC stays, LTCH stays
following an acute hospital stay are relatively common among patients with stroke,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, heart failure and shock, hip replacement,
septicemia, and having a tracheotomy with ventilator support [26]. LTCHs are gen-
erally the most expensive PAC setting: payment rates for clinically similar patients
have been as high as 12 times the rates received by other PAC providers under the
Medicare program [27].
In general, LTCHs are believed to treat patients with greater disease severity than
would be found in SNFs and IRFs, they are believed to have a narrower treatment
focus by specializing in respiratory, rehabilitative and mental health care, and they
are believed to provide more medically intense treatment than conventional PAC
providers. These beliefs, however, are based on a fairly limited body of research
on LTCH patients, operations and outcomes. First, research focusing on LTCHs
has been largely limited to the study of ventilator patients [12]. Although ventilator
patients are thought of as the quintessential LTCH patient, in fact they made of only
10.6% of all LTCH patients in 2004 [29]. Second, the role of LTCHs in the larger
context of PAC has not been addressed in research. Research specific to LTCHs,
focusing on the ventilator population, does not generally recognize conventional PAC
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settings as possible alternatives to LTCH care. Analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that
this is not the case for all ventilator dependent patients; it is also unlikely to be
true for patients with medical conditions more commonly treated in conventional
PAC settings. Moreover, broader studies of PAC generally do not fully account for
LTCHs. In studies of PAC utilization, PAC provider operations, patient caseloads
and outcomes, LTCHs often comprise the ‘other’ group if they are considered at
all. Indeed, studying LTCHs is difficult simply for the reason there are very few
stays compared to conventional PAC settings. For example, in 2004, 13% of hospital
stays among Medicare beneficiaries were followed by SNF stays; to contrast, just
1% of hospital stays were followed by LTCH stays [28] [27]. Appropriately studying
LTCHs requires an over-sampling of patients. Consequently, how LTCHs compare
to conventional PAC settings like SNFs and IRFs is not well understood.
Analysis of means in Chapter 2 quantitatively assesses LTCHs’ role in PAC mar-
kets by identifying similarity in structural characteristics, patient caseloads, and
inputs to patient care among LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs. In addition, regression anal-
ysis identifies local market characteristics associated with LTCHs’ regional variation.
The analysis reveals that LTCHs are more similar to other PAC providers than pre-
viously thought. For example, LTCHs devote more nursing to patient care than
other PAC providers, but use of therapy is similar to SNFs’ use, and far less than
IRFs’ use. But, LTCHs appear to provide more medically intense treatment than
other providers. The analysis also reveals that substitution occurs primarily among
LTCHs and hospital-based SNFs and IRFs, rather than freestanding SNFs and IRFs.
For example, areas with LTCHs in operation have more LTCH stays following acute
hospital stays and fewer hospital based SNF and IRF stays, compared to the national
average. Also, LTCHs tend to be located in areas with lower concentration of some
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types of hospital-based PAC providers. It is possible that LTCHs address an unmet
need for relatively intense PAC services in the communities where they locate.
In Chapter 3, the analysis measures the policy effect of Medicare’s prospective
payment system for LTCH, and tests whether responses to prospective payment
are uniform among LTCHs. Prospective payment reimburses providers for patient
care using fixed rates per stay according to patients’ characteristics. In general,
the expected response by health care providers under prospective payment is to
provide fewer services and fewer days of care than if they were reimbursed for each
service provided. The intent of prospective payment is to create financial incentives
for providers to provide cost-effective treatment. The prospective payment system
for LTCHs differs from other prospective systems in that hospitals must quality as
LTCHs to be eligible for LTCH-PPS payment rate: they must maintain an average
length of stay above 25 days among their Medicare patients. This eligibility criterion
alters financial incentives among LTCHs with different facility average lengths of stay.
While some LTCHs may be able to shorten patient stays under prospective payment
without regard to maintaining eligibility, other LTCHs’ interest in maintaining their
LTCH status may override the financial incentives of prospective payment. LTCHs
with baseline average LOS above 32 days shorten patient stays on average by 5.7
days. LTCHs with baseline averages between 25 and 32 days appear to protect their
eligibility to the LTCH-PPS payment rates: these LTCHs shorten patient stays by 1.6
days on average. LTCHs with averages below 25 days, those which are directly at risk
for losing eligibility, also appear to protect their LTCH status. These LTCHs provide
longer stays under prospective payment by an average of 0.1 day. These policy effects
are generally robust to regression to the mean and other natural changes in LOS over
time.
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Finally, Chapter 4 tests how well SNFs, LTCHs, and IRFs substitute for each other
in providing care to prolonged mechanically ventilated patients. This study uses an
instrumental variables approach to compare patient health and cost outcomes among
SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs. Choice of PAC setting is instrumented with measures
of proximity: differential distance to LTCHs and IRFs, and the number of SNFs,
LTCHs, and IRFs located within 100 miles of patient residence. The analysis suggests
that LTCHs outperform SNFs for some patients, but cannot conclude that LTCHs
outperform SNFs for all patients. Among some patients, LTCH patients experience
mortality rates that are roughly 50% lower than SNF patients. Other study outcomes
include PAC complication rates, readmission to acute hospitals, and 6-month follow
up costs. The analysis does not find conclusive results on the comparison of IRF and
SNF care. In some cases, it appears that IRFs outperform SNFs, but, in general,
results are inconclusive. With respect to the relatively generous payment that LTCHs
receive to treat patients with prolonged mechanical ventilation during their acute
hospital stay, these results suggest that differential payments across PAC setting are
not necessarily undesirable, nor inefficient.
CHAPTER II
Long-Term Care Hospitals in Markets for Post-Acute Care:
A Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Many observers of health care trends have noted the rising importance of the post-
acute care (PAC) sector in the U.S. health care system. The Medicare program has
experienced tremendous growth in PAC utilization and expenditure since the 1980s.
Most of this growth has been among conventional institutional PAC providers, in-
cluding skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs).
Though accounting for a small portion of Medicare PAC expenditure, the fastest
growth in the number of providers, utilization, and payments per stay has been
among Long-Term Care Hospitals (LTCHs) [30].
Accredited acute care hospitals can qualify as Long-Term Hospitals (LTCHs) un-
der the Medicare program if they maintain an average length of stay above 25 days
among their Medicare patients. Medicare is the principal payer of LTCH services.
LTCHs primarily serve long-staying patients, and provide recuperative and rehabili-
tative care following short-term acute hospital stays. In 2004 there were 353 LTCHs
operating in 42 states and 137 U.S. metropolitan areas. The purpose of this analysis
is to assess how similar LTCHs are to other providers of recuperative and rehabilita-
tive care following acute hospital stays, and to identify the local market conditions
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related to where LTCHs locate.
LTCHs are of particular interest to policymakers for reasons beyond the rapid
growth among LTCHs. There are, as yet, some important unanswered questions
about LTCHs and their operations. LTCHs are widely believed to have a narrower
treatment focus than conventional PAC providers. In particular, LTCHs are believed
to specialize in treating patients with high disease severity and acuity, to specialize
in providing respiratory, rehabilitative and mental health care, and to provide more
medically intense treatment than would be provided by SNFs and IRFs. Never-
theless, there is concern that LTCHs are more similar to these providers than our
current understanding would suggest. This is of particular concern for the Medi-
care program, the primary payer of PAC services in the U.S., because the program
reimburses, regulates and covers services from LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs very differ-
ently. The more similar these classes of providers are to each other, the greater the
potential there is for substitution of treatment services among them, and the more
similarly the Medicare program should treat them.
To test whether LTCHs specialize in treating higher severity patients, specialize in
respiratory, rehabilitative and mental health care, and whether LTCH care is more
medically intense than care provided by SNFs and IRFs, this analysis examines
statistical information on the operations of PAC providers. We examine similarity
among these classes of providers by looking at patient caseloads, use of nursing and
therapy personnel, use of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in patient care, and
service offerings among LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs. A strong case can be made that
substitution occurs primarily among LTCHs and hospital-based SNFs and IRFs,
rather than with freestanding SNFs and IRFs. We also find that that LTCH care is
more medically intense than other providers’, that LTCHs employ more nurses than
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other providers, but not more therapists. LTCHs also offer some services not offered
by other PAC providers.
Another important policy question surrounding LTCHs is whether they add value
to the Medicare program and, whether patients who use LTCHs are better off than
comparable patients who do not. Although one could ask the same question of any
type of medical care, it is particularly apropos to ask this about LTCHs because with
so few LTCHs, most U.S. communities do not have one and it is not clear that those
communities are worse off because of it. Growth in LTCHs has followed an uneven
path, and currently there are several cities with multiple LTCHs in operation but
some states without any. To better understand LTCHs’ role in health care markets,
it is crucial to understand why LTCHs have chosen to locate where they have.
We provide a comparison of population health characteristics and concentration
of health care providers in metropolitan areas with and without LTCHs in oper-
ation to identify market characteristics related to LTCHs’ location. The analysis
tests whether LTCHs tend to be located in areas with particular population health
characteristics and patterns of health care provider concentration to discern whether
they might address unmet demand for health care services. We find that the health
characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries are unrelated to LTCH’s location. However,
LTCHs do tend to locate in areas with higher concentrations of hospitals, general
PAC providers, as well as, specialist physicians. In locating in these areas, LTCHs
may address a specific unmet need for PAC services that does not express itself in
beneficiaries’ health characteristics. On the other hand, LTCHs may choose to locate
in areas where there is a greater propensity to use post-acute and specialized services
that is unrelated to need.
In the next section, we present background on LTCHs, including the historical
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reasons why LTCH practices are thought to differ so significantly from other PAC
providers, and several reasons why their similarity ought to be reassessed. We then
describe our approach to comparing LTCH practices to the practices of hospital-based
and freestanding SNFs and IRFs, and our approach to comparing the characteristics
of markets with and without LTCHs in operation. Section 2.3 presents the compari-
son of LTCH, SNF and IRF patient caseloads and inputs to care. Section 2.4 presents
findings on market characteristics related to LTCHs location. Finally, Section 2.5
summarizes the findings and discusses policy implications.
2.2 Background
Long-Term Care Hospitals are widely believed to differ from other post-acute care
providers in three fundamental ways. First, LTCHs are believed to treat patients
with higher acuity and disease severity than would typically be found in SNFs and
IRFs. Second, LTCHs are generally thought to have a narrower treatment focus
than SNFs and IRFs by specializing in treatment for patients requiring respiratory,
rehabilitative and mental health treatment. Finally, LTCHs are widely believed
to provide more medically intense post-acute care than SNFs and IRFs. These
fundamental differences in patient populations and treatment focus would suggest
very limited potential for substitution of treatment among LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs.
However, there are several factors related to LTCHs’ current operations that sug-
gest LTCHs, relative to SNFs and IRFs might no longer admit higher acuity pa-
tients, have a narrower treatment focus, and no longer provide more medically in-
tense treatment. Consequently, there might be greater similarity in operations and
greater interchangeability of care provided than is generally recognized. This section
presents background on LTCHs, reasons why LTCH practices are thought to differ
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significantly from other providers, and reasons why similarity ought to be assessed.
LTCHs’ history as a niche provider supports the notion that their practices dif-
fer significantly from other providers in patients’ disease severity, treatment focus,
and the medical intensity of care provided. LTCHs are designed to provide very
extensive medical and rehabilitative care to chronic critically ill patients. Whereas
conventional PAC settings like SNFs and IRFs benefited from a demand for post-
acute services for patients with common medical needs, LTCHs grew out of demand
for specialized services. The modern LTCH emerged in the 1980s as an alternative
provider to ICUs in treating long staying, difficult to wean, mechanically ventilated
patients. New construction of LTCHs accelerated once their success in weaning
long-term, ventilator-dependent patients was found to be as good or better than
traditional ICUs. The oldest LTCHs, which were former tuberculosis and chronic
disease hospitals, also changed their treatment focus to accommodate the needs of
these and other chronic critically ill patients [16].
Over time LTCHs became a setting where many different types of chronic criti-
cally ill patients could be treated in lieu of prolonged acute hospital stays. LTCHs’
exclusion from Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) for acute care hospi-
tals made LTCHs an attractive discharge destination from the perspective of acute
hospitals. Financial losses on extremely costly patients could be limited by discharg-
ing to these facilities [12]. LTCHs, being reimbursed on costs under the TEFRA
program for their Medicare patients, did not face the same financial risk and would
have been willing to treat even the most expensive patients.1 With these incen-
tives, LTCHs expanded their treatment focus to include specialization in rehabili-
tative and mental health care, in addition to respiratory care. Indeed, Lui et al.
1TEFRA: Tax, Equity, and Fiscal Responsibility Act. Under TEFRA, providers were reimbursed based
on their incurred costs with fairly weak limits.[27]
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(2001) found that, as of 1997, most of the oldest LTCHs (operating before 1984)
had a multispecialty focus, where no one specialty area dominated among patients.
In contrast, newer LTCHs were found to more frequently have either respiratory- or
rehabilitation-focused treatment[22]. Interestingly, much of the growth in LTCHs has
been concentrated among those located on the campuses of other hospitals (the so-
called ‘hospitals-within-hospitals’) and among for-profit LTCHs. For-profit LTCHs
are often part of larger hospital chains; two for-profit chains, Kindred Health Care
and Select Medical Corporation, dominate the industry, each operating in 24 states.
The characteristics of LTCH patients also suggest a relatively high level of acuity,
compared to other PAC patients. One study found that more than one half of LTCH
patients had more than five diagnoses upon admission to LTCHs, suggesting multiple
comorbid conditions. Patients were also found to be less stable at admission than
patients admitted to other PAC settings [35].
LTCHs are believed to devote more skilled nursing and therapy to patient care
than would typically be found in other PAC settings, suggesting that LTCHs tend
to provide more medically intense care than other providers. Treatment for me-
chanically ventilated patients, LTCHs’ quintessential patient, is ideally rehabilitation
focused and multidisciplinary, drawing input from nurses, respiratory therapists, nu-
tritionists, as well as physical, speech and occupational therapists [38] [43]. Anecdotal
evidence, collected by MedPAC through interviews of LTCH clinicians, suggests that
LTCH care consists of active daily physician time, 6 to 10 hours daily of licensed nurse
time, and use multidisciplinary teams of specialty nurses, respiratory therapists, as
well as speech, occupational and physical therapy in patient care. Interviewed clini-
cians insisted that LTCHs devote greater skilled labor to patient care than would be
found in other PAC settings [27].
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Although LTCHs’ history gives credence to the notion that LTCHs admit higher
severity patients, have a narrower treatment focus, and provide more medically in-
tense treatment than SNFs and IRFs, these notions have not been systematically
evaluated. Moreover, there are several reasons why these notions, even if they were
once true, may no longer be representative of LTCH practices. Recent changes in
how LTCHs are paid under the Medicare program, their uneven geographical distri-
bution across the U.S., as well as a limited understanding of the true scope of LTCH
patient caseloads, call into question just how different LTCHs really are from other
PAC providers.
Recent changes in financial incentives under the Medicare program no longer en-
courage LTCHs to treat patients with high expected treatment costs. Patients with
high disease severity are likely to be costlier to treat than low severity patients. Un-
der cost-based reimbursement, LTCHs did not take on financial risk when admitting
patients. There was neither an incentive to provide cost-effective care, nor a disincen-
tive to treat costly patients. The LTCH prospective payment system (LTCH-PPS)
under the Medicare program (introduced in 2002) is intended to give providers a fi-
nancial incentive to control costs, but may also discourage LTCHs from treating the
costliest patients. The LTCH-PPS established the financial incentive for LTCHs to
admit patients with relatively low resource needs, so long as they are relatively long
staying.2 The third chapter of this dissertation is an analysis of LTCHs’ response to
the introduction of the LTCH-PPS; the analysis shows that the majority of LTCHs
experienced shorter stays under PPS than under cost-based reimbursement. Stays
were shorter for two reasons: LTCHs admitted patients who were likely to have
shorter stays, and LTCHs provided fewer days of care. The effect of PPS on LTCH’s
2LTCHs must maintain an average length of stay above 25 days to remain eligible for the LTCH-PPS
under the Medicare program.
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practices may mean that LTCHs are no longer willing to be a provider of last resort
for very costly patients.
Uneven geographic distribution of LTCHs and their clustering in some metropoli-
tan areas has two implications for their operations. First, uneven distribution sug-
gests that LTCH care replaces care provided in other settings, and therefore, must
be somewhat interchangeable. LTCHs are clustered in several metropolitan areas,
while most U.S. communities do not have any LTCHs in operation. In communities
where there are no LTCHs in operation, patients who would be good candidates
for LTCH treatment must seek care in alternative settings. Recent work has found
that these patients have longer acute hospital stays than they would if LTCHs were
available, and are more likely to use SNF care [27]. In communities where LTCHs
have clustered, and there are several in operation, LTCHs are likely compete with
each other for patients. Competition for patients may have caused LTCHs to begin
admitting patients with lower average disease severity than was true several years
ago as they look for stable streams of patients [27]. LTCHs may also compete with
SNFs and IRFs for patients who may not have been considered good candidates for
LTCH care several years ago.
Finally, most of what is known about LTCH patient caseloads may actually only
be relevant for a subset of their patients. LTCHs’ quintessential patient-the me-
chanically ventilated patient-actually only makes up a minority of their caseloads.
This study finds that 22% of all LTCH patients have respiratory system diagnoses.
Almost none of the literature on LTCH patients, operations, and outcomes considers
patients other than those requiring respiratory care [12]. Hence, the conventional
wisdom about how LTCH caseloads differ from other PAC providers’ caseloads may
not represent actual differences.
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For these reasons, there is cause to reevaluate our understanding of how similar
LTCHs are to other PAC providers.
2.3 Approach
This analysis draws on several different data sources to identify similarities be-
tween LTCHs and other post-acute care settings and to identify market characteris-
tics related to the location of LTCHs. First, the 2004 Provider of Service (POS) file,
a licensure file maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, con-
tains detailed information about health care facilities participating in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Second, the 2004 Area Resource File is a compendium of
county-level data from various sources on population, health resources and facilities,
and health professionals. Finally, the Medicare Denominator and Inpatient and SNF
claims data contain information on acute hospital and post-acute care use among a
sample of Medicare beneficiaries during 2004.
This analysis uses two modes of analysis. First, attributes of LTCHs, SNFs and
IRFs are compared using information available about hospitals (LTCHs and IRFs)
and SNFs in the POS file. We compare means, 25th and 75th percentile values
of facility attributes. We also include a subgroup of LTCHs for comparison: those
operating before 1984. This cohort of ‘old LTCHs’ is included to informally test
whether the beliefs about how LTCHs differ from other PAC providers may have
been driven by differences between older LTCHs and other PAC providers.
In some cases, the comparison of IRFs is limited to freestanding IRFs, about 16%
of all IRFs operating in 2004. Unfortunately, only very basic information is available
about hospital-based IRFs in the POS file because they are considered units within
larger acute care hospitals and reporting is conducted at the acute care hospital
16
level. Patient claims for services provided within these units are identifiable, but
we do not have information about treatment setting characteristics specific to the
unit. Comparison of SNFs is restricted to include SNFs that participate only in the
Medicare program, about 6% of all SNFs. We exclude Medicare/Medicaid SNFs
and Distinct Part SNFs because they do not comprise a good comparison group
for LTCHs. These facilities provide custodial care to patients in addition to PAC
services and the resources devoted to custodial care cannot be differentiated from
those devoted to PAC.
To compare patients treated in LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs we use a 10% sample
of Medicare beneficiaries with at least one acute hospital stay during 2004. These
beneficiaries’ acute hospital stays are matched with subsequent post-acute stays as
applicable. By linking these stays, we have detailed information on medical diagnoses
and procedures used during both the acute and post-acute stays. We aggregate these
data to the facility level and compare the composition of providers’ patient base. We
characterize patients according to their acute hospital admission diagnosis rather
than their post-acute diagnosis in order to help ensure comparing similar sets of
patients.
Although many LTCHs are located on the campuses of acute care hospitals
(‘hospitals-within-hospitals’), we do not separate LTCHs along this dimension for
our analyses. The primary reason is that the information is not available in the POS
file, and classifying LTCHs as freestanding or hospitals-within-hospitals would be an
approximation.
In the second mode of analysis, we conduct regression analysis to estimate the as-
sociation between patient and market characteristics and LTCH location. For this,
we use several different measures of LTCH location. Table 2.1 provides summary
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statistics on the five measures of LTCH location. First, we calculated the distance
from beneficiaries’ zip code to the nearest LTCH, and regressed this measure (log
transformed) on beneficiary health and hospital stay variables using an OLS model.
Second, we counted the number of LTCHs within 100 miles of beneficiaries’ resi-
dence. We regressed an indicator variable for having any LTCHs within 100 miles
on the same set of beneficiary variables using a Logit regression model. Finally, we
estimated a Poisson regression model using the number of LTCHs within 100 miles
of beneficiary residence and the set of beneficiary variables. With these models, we
identify demographic and health characteristics of residents that may attract LTCHs.
Beneficiary level data come from the 10% sample of Medicare beneficiaries with at
least one hospital stay in 2004.
On the market level, we use two LTCH location measures: LTCHs’ share of PAC
beds and LTCHs’ share of PAC stays. The denominators for these market share
measures are the total number of certified beds and total number of stays in LTCHs,
Medicare-only SNFs, and IRFs (all stays follow an acute hospital stay). Overall,
LTCHs’ average share of PAC beds is 10.4% and average share of PAC stays is
11.4%.3
For markets we use ‘statistical areas’ as defined by the Office of Management and
Budget. Our markets consist of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas
which are part of a larger Combined Statistical Area (CSA), and Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas which are not part of a larger unit. Metropolitan Areas consist of at
least one county and includes the counties comprising the urban core (with popula-
tions at least 50,000), as well as the adjacent counties with a high degree of social
3Note that the maximum LTCH bed share is 100% (indicating that at least one market has no Medicare-
only SNFs or IRFs), but the maximum LTCH share of stays is 95% (indicating that, at most, 95% of PAC
stays in any one market occur in LTCHs). The apparent discrepancy between these measures is possible
because beneficiaries’ use of PAC providers is not limited to the PAC providers in their market. Market
definitions do not reflect beneficiaries’ PAC use.
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Table 2.1: Measures of LTCH Location
Unit of 25th 50th 75th
Location Measures Observation N Mean SD %ile %ile %ile Max
Distance To Nearest
LTCH (miles) Beneficiary 508,403 40.2 120.3 5.5 12.7 31.1 1,426.4
One or More LTCHs
within 100 miles Beneficiary 508,403 0.9 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Number of LTCHs
within 100 miles Beneficiary 508,403 8.6 6.0 3 9 14 24
LTCH Share of PAC
Beds
Analysis
Market 323 10.4% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 17.1% 100.0%
LTCH Share of PAC
Stays
Analysis
Market 323 11.4% 16.6% 0.0% 6.2% 14.6% 94.5%
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator File, 2004 POS file, 2004 Area Resource File
and economic integration with the urban core. CSAs aggregate adjacent MSAs and
Micropolitan Statistical Areas (adjacent and integrated counties with an urban core
population 10,000-49,999) when the MSAs and/or Micropolitalan Areas have suffi-
cient social and economic integration. Our analysis markets consist of 323 statistical
areas, of which 116 are CSAs and 207 are MSAs. The 323 markets represent 1,326
of the 3,225 U.S. counties. LTCHs operate in 137 of the analysis markets.
The following section presents statistical information on the operations of LTCHs,
SNFs, and IRFs. We then move to the analysis of market characteristics and LTCH
location.
2.4 Comparison of Facility Operations
This section presents a comparison of patient populations and treatment setting
characteristics among LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs. We present comparisons of the pa-
tients each PAC setting draws from acute hospitals, patient caseloads treated in
each setting, and the inputs to care used in these settings. The purpose is to as-
sess the three stereotypes about LTCHs: that they admit higher severity patients
than other PAC providers, that LTCHs have a narrower treatment focus than more
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conventional PAC settings, and finally, that LTCHs provide more medically intense
treatment than other PAC providers.
To begin, Table 2.2 presents basic structural characteristics of LTCHs, SNFs and
IRFs operating in 2004 that are used in this analysis. LTCHs are slightly larger
institutions than freestanding SNFs and IRFs, on average, and quite a bit bigger
than hospital-based SNFs and IRFs. There are a range of control types among
PAC providers. Like freestanding SNFs and IRFs, more than half of LTCHs are
proprietary, or for-profit, institutions. Hospital-based SNFs and IRFs are primarily
non-profit or government operated; these facilities are typically owned and operated
together with their host institution. Overall, 8% of LTCHs are government operated.
Government-operated LTCHs are concentrated among the oldest LTCHs: nearly
half of LTCHs operating before 1984 (and still operating in 2004) continue to be
government operated.
LTCHs are not distributed geographically in proportion to the U.S. aged popula-
tion, the main population served by LTCHs. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of aged
persons (2002 population estimate) across Census Divisions, compared to the distri-
bution of PAC providers. One-third of LTCHs are located in the West South Central
region, while only 10% of persons over 65 reside in this region. On the other hand,
there are disproportionately few LTCHs in Middle and South Atlantic regions, and
the Pacific region. IRFs have a geographical distribution that is similar to LTCHs:
there are disproportionately many in the West South Central region, and dispro-
portionately few in East and West North Central and Pacific regions (freestanding
IRFs), and the New England and South Atlantic regions (hospital-based IRFs). In
contrast, the table shows that Medicare-only freestanding and hospital-based SNFs
are distributed roughly proportionately to the aged population.
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Table 2.2: Structural Characteristics of LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs
Size and Ownership All LTCHs Old LTCHs FS SNFs HB SNFs FS IRFs HB IRFs
Number of Facilities 353 39 419 463 217 1,111
Number of Beds
Mean (SD) 69 (87) 198 (185) 56 (42) 24 (17) 64 (40)† 25 (19)
25 & 75%ile 30, 79 96, 215 30, 70 15, 28 38, 82 14, 30
Non-Profit 33% 44% † 46% 70% 33%† 69%
Proprietary 59% 8% 53% † 19% 62%† 16%
Government 8% 49% 1%† 12%† 5%† 15%
Source: 2004 POS File
Note: Old LTCHs include LTCHs operating before 1984.
Note: SNFs are Medicare-only. FS= Freestanding HB= Hospital-Based
Note: † Statistics are not statistically different from All LTCH statistics (5% level).
Other statistics are.







LTCHs FS SNF HB SNF FS IRF HB IRF
New England 5% 6% 43% 7% 4% 6% 2%*
Middle Atlantic 15% 9% 19% 16%* 14%* 16%* 16%*
East North Central 16% 17% 5% 20% 16% 8%* 21%
West North Central 7% 5% 0% 7% 8%* 4% 7%
South Atlantic 20% 14% 16% 17% 18% 18% 12%
East South Central 6% 6% 0% 5% 6% 8% 5%
West South Central 10% 33% 11% 11%* 9%* 29% 17%*
Mountain 6% 6% 3% 5% 6% 7% 7%
Pacific 14% 5% 3% 13%* 18%* 4% 13%*
Source: 2004 POS file, 2004 Area Resource File
Note: * Statistics are different from All LTCH statistics at the 5% level.
Aged population size is a 2002 estimate.
2.4.1 Patient Base and Caseloads
Nationally, LTCH stays are a relatively rare PAC outcome: only about 1% of
hospital stays among all Medicare beneficiaries are followed by an LTCH stay [27].
Owing to the small number of LTCH stays, there is not a very good understanding
of what makes patients good candidates for LTCH care. MedPAC (2004) found
anecdotal evidence that LTCHs conduct extensive screening and target admissions
among patients with high disease severity whose conditions are likely to improve.
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This suggests that admission to LTCHs is highly subjective and that LTCHs exercise
control over which patients are admitted. MedPAC also found that the strongest
predictor of LTCH use is undergoing tracheostomy in an area with a least one LTCH
in operation. How the population of patients treated in LTCHs differs from patients
using other PAC settings is not well understood, because there are so few predictors
of LTCH admission and relatively few LTCH stays.
Therefore, it is useful to consider which patients are likely to use LTCHs for PAC
treatment and to compare the characteristics of patients treated in LTCHs to those
treated elsewhere. In particular, we are interested in whether LTCHs systemati-
cally admit higher severity patients and whether LTCH patient caseloads are more
concentrated in their specialty areas than other PAC providers’ patient caseloads.
Previous work found that many LTCHs serve relatively high proportions of patients
with respiratory system or rehabilitation-related medical conditions. A minority of
LTCHs also specialize in treating patients with mental health conditions [22]. We
use Liu’s definitions of these specialty areas. Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 present
information to this end.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the use of post-acute care by Medicare beneficiaries
following acute hospital stays in 2004 grouped by their acute hospital diagnosis. For
each diagnostic category, the tables show the percent of all hospital stays that are
followed by a particular PAC outcome (including no PAC). Diagnoses are grouped
into the 25 Major Diagnostic Categories. The ‘All’ columns represent PAC use for
each diagnostic category for the total sample of Medicare beneficiaries (a national
estimate). The ‘LTCH Markets’ columns represent PAC use for each diagnostic
category in the 137 markets with at least one LTCH in operation.
The first column in Table 2.4 reports the percent of all hospital stays in each
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diagnostic category which are followed by an LTCH stay. Although only about 1%
of all hospital stays are followed by an LTCH stay, LTCH stays occur more frequently
among some groups of patients. More than 1% of patients are discharged to LTCHs
from acute hospitals among Medicare patients with Burns (MDC 22), Infectious
and Parasitic Diseases (MDC 18), Injuries and Toxic Effects of Drugs (MDC 21),
HIV/AIDS (MDC 25), Skin and Tissue conditions (MDC 9), as well as Respiratory
(MDC 4) and Nervous System conditions (MDC 1).4
Interestingly, LTCH stays are not particularly concentrated among patients in
the diagnostic categories corresponding to the traditional LTCH specialties: rehabil-
itation, and respiratory system and mental health conditions. The respiratory care
specialty includes only the Respiratory System MDC (MDC 4). Whereas about 1%
of all hospital stays are followed by an LTCH stay, only a slightly higher percent,
1.15%, of stays in this MDC are followed by an LTCH stay. The rehabilitative care
specialty includes the Nervous System (MDC 1), Musculoskeletal and Connective
Tissue MDC (MDC 8), and Factors Influencing Health Status (MDC 23). This last
MDC includes screening, aftercare and rehabilitation diagnoses. Only among pa-
tients in the Nervous System MDC do LTCH stays occur slightly more frequently
than 1% (1.02%). Finally, the mental health specialty includes only the Mental Dis-
eases MDC (MDC 19). Less than 1% of patients in this diagnostic category have
LTCH stays after their acute hospital stays. Thus, although recent work found that
many LTCHs had patient caseloads concentrated in these diagnostic groups [22],
patients in these categories are not relatively likely to use LTCHs over other PAC
settings.
4It should be noted that, because LTCH stays are overall relatively infrequent events, relatively frequent
LTCH stays among beneficiaries in these diagnostic categories does not necessarily imply that having a
condition in these diagnostic categories would be predictive of having an LTCH stay in a multivariate
regression context.
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Table 2.4: Use of Post-Acute Care Following Acute Hospital Stay, by Acute Hospital Major Diag-
nostic Category
Post-Acute Care Setting
LTCH FS SNF HB SNF
Acute LTCH LTCH LTCH
Admission: MDC All Mkts. All Mkts. All Mkts.
1 Nervous System 1.02% 1.35% 0.74% 1.04% 1.30% 1.27%
2 Eye 0.37% 0.27% 0.37% 0.37% 0.43% 0.27%
3 Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat 0.74% 1.05% 0.58% 0.81% 0.94% 1.05%
4 Respiratory System 1.15% 1.64% 0.52% 0.73% 1.30% 1.28%
5 Circulatory System 0.47% 0.64% 0.39% 0.55% 0.82% 0.84%
6 Digestive System 0.62% 0.86% 0.48% 0.67% 1.03% 1.02%
7
Hepatobiliary System &
Pancreas 0.53% 0.74% 0.28% 0.41% 0.77% 0.74%
8
Musculoskeletal System &
Connective Tissue 0.86% 1.24% 1.91% 2.62% 3.90% 3.82%
9
Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue
& Breast 1.81% 2.47% 0.60% 0.83% 1.92% 1.89%
10
Endocrine, Nutritional &
Metabolic System 0.75% 1.04% 0.63% 0.87% 1.24% 1.30%
11 Kidney and Urinary Tract 0.71% 0.98% 0.55% 0.76% 1.05% 1.03%
12 & 13 Reproductive System 0.19% 0.24% 0.22% 0.28% 0.47% 0.49%
16
Blood & Blood Forming
Organs and Immunological
Disorders 0.42% 0.58% 0.47% 0.68% 0.81% 0.70%
17
Myeloproliferative & Poorly
Differentiated Disorders 0.52% 0.70% 0.21% 0.29% 0.75% 0.65%
18
Infectious & Parasitic
Diseases 1.82% 2.39% 0.65% 0.85% 1.57% 1.39%
19
Mental Diseases &
Disorders 0.54% 0.73% 0.48% 0.64% 0.75% 0.68%
20
Alcohol/Drug Use or
Induced Mental Disorders 0.23% 0.29% 0.15% 0.17% 0.35% 0.25%
21
Injuries, Poison & Toxic
Effect of Drugs 1.38% 1.76% 0.69% 0.91% 1.47% 1.43%
22 Burns 2.46% 2.92% 0.98% 1.25% 1.97% 1.67%
23
Factors Influencing Health
Status 0.99% 1.32% 1.00% 1.33% 1.70% 1.68%
25 HIV Infection 1.80% 2.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.27%
Source: 2004 Medicare Inpatient and SNF Claims files, 2004 POS file.
Note: 137 statistical areas have at least one LTCH in operation. No cases were
found in MDC 14, 15 and 24. MDC 12 and 13 were combined. FS = Freestanding
HB = Hospital Based. Note: FS and HB SNFs are Medicare-only SNFs.
Other SNFs include Medicare/Medicaid SNFs and Distinct-Part SNFs.
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Table 2.5: Use of Post-Acute Care Following Acute Hospital Stay, Continued
Post-Acute Care Setting
FS IRF HB IRF Other SNF Other/No PAC
LTCH LTCH LTCH LTCH
MDC All Mkts. All Mkts. All Mkts. All Mkts.
1 2.68% 3.04% 1.06% 0.92% 16.50% 16.97% 75.53% 74.53%
2 0.61% 0.73% 0.73% 0.64% 8.47% 7.59% 88.12% 89.48%
3 0.33% 0.41% 0.71% 0.67% 8.59% 8.89% 87.19% 86.57%
4 0.53% 0.64% 1.06% 0.81% 13.51% 14.28% 80.55% 79.73%
5 0.57% 0.67% 2.00% 1.71% 8.08% 8.61% 85.68% 85.25%
6 0.41% 0.49% 0.90% 0.62% 10.01% 10.52% 85.60% 85.24%
7 0.29% 0.36% 1.33% 0.90% 7.08% 7.49% 88.21% 88.22%
8 5.99% 7.09% 0.88% 0.80% 26.36% 27.16% 58.42% 56.37%
9 0.58% 0.73% 0.61% 0.49% 15.46% 16.41% 77.89% 76.56%
10 0.54% 0.63% 0.75% 0.61% 17.69% 18.75% 77.37% 76.32%
11 0.47% 0.60% 0.70% 0.50% 16.31% 16.80% 79.22% 78.67%
12 & 13 0.13% 0.20% 0.27% 0.22% 3.57% 4.25% 94.87% 94.15%
16 0.29% 0.35% 0.82% 0.60% 11.64% 12.49% 84.61% 84.00%
17 0.15% 0.17% 0.73% 0.51% 5.14% 5.48% 91.56% 91.65%
18 0.56% 0.68% 1.19% 0.74% 18.72% 19.48% 74.21% 73.68%
19 0.50% 0.53% 0.60% 0.50% 17.33% 16.40% 78.48% 79.30%
20 0.03% 0.00% 0.55% 0.75% 4.89% 4.69% 92.17% 92.33%
21 1.45% 1.73% 0.91% 0.80% 15.16% 15.94% 77.50% 76.47%
22 1.23% 2.08% 1.97% 1.25% 12.04% 11.25% 76.41% 77.08%
23 1.11% 1.31% 0.96% 0.77% 23.99% 24.20% 68.81% 68.48%
25 0.00% 0.00% 0.90% 1.08% 7.66% 7.53% 88.74% 88.71%
Source: 2004 Medicare Inpatient and SNF Claims files, 2004 POS file.
Note: 137 statistical areas have at least one LTCH in operation. No cases were
found in MDC 14, 15 and 24. MDC 12 and 13 were combined. FS = Freestanding
HB = Hospital Based. Note: FS and HB SNFs are Medicare-only SNFs.
Other SNFs include Medicare/Medicaid SNFs and Distinct-Part SNFs.
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The second column of Table 2.4 reports LTCH use among beneficiaries who reside
in analysis markets with at least one LTCH in operation. Not surprisingly, LTCH use
is higher among beneficiaries who have an LTCH operating in their metropolitan area.
Other columns in this table and in Table 2.5, a continuation of Table 2.4, report use of
post-acute care in other settings (freestanding and hospital-based SNFs (Medicare-
only) and IRFs, other SNFs, and Other or No PAC use) among all patients, and
among patients in analysis markets with at least one LTCH. This table shows for
which patients LTCH care appears to replace the use of other types of post-acute
care.
For most diagnostic categories, greater use of LTCHs in the markets with LTCHs
entails lower use of hospital-based SNFs and hospital-based IRFs. For example, in
markets with LTCHs, 1.35% of patients in the Nervous System MDC (MDC 1) have
an LTCH stay following their acute hospital stay, compared to 1.02% overall. As
use of LTCHs increases in markets with LTCHs, the use of hospital-based SNFs
and hospital-based IRFs declines from 1.3% (all patients) to 1.27% (markets with
LTCHs) and from 1.06% to .92%, respectively. In contrast, the use of freestanding
SNFs and IRFs increases among patients in LTCH markets, compared to overall.
The consistency in these trade-offs suggest that substitution primarily occurs
between LTCHs and hospital-based providers. For most diagnostic categories, an
increased use of LTCH care is matched with a decline in the use of either or both
hospital-based SNFs and IRFs. For no set of patients is greater use of LTCH paired
with a decreased use of freestanding SNFs, and for only patients with Alcohol-related
conditions (MDC 20) does there appear to be a trade-off with freestanding IRFs.
The last two columns in Table 2.5 represent patients with either no PAC following
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their acute hospital stay, or care provided by other types of providers. Other types
of providers include other acute care hospitals and psychiatric hospitals. For many
diagnostic classes, fewer patients in the LTCH markets have either no PAC or another
type follow-up care, compared to patients overall. This suggests substitution between
LTCHs and acute hospitals. The likely story is that having LTCHs available allows
acute hospitals to discharge patients who would have otherwise remained in the acute
care setting for a prolonged period before eventually returning to the community,
with no further institutional PAC treatment. If this is the case, LTCH care may also
be similar to care provided in acute hospitals.
To evaluate whether LTCHs admit patients with higher disease acuity and whether
their caseloads are concentrated in their specialty areas, relative to other PAC
providers, we compare patient caseloads across PAC settings. Tables 2.6 and 2.7
presents the characteristics of patients treated in LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs and sug-
gests two things. First, LTCH patients appear to have somewhat higher disease
severity than users of other types of PAC; second, despite differences in disease
severity, caseloads appear remarkably similar across PAC settings.
LTCH patients have significantly longer acute hospital stays preceding their LTCH
stays than users of other types of PAC. This is true for all LTCHs and for old LTCHs
(operating before 1984). One possible explanation is that it takes patients who are
ultimately discharged to LTCHs about twice as long for their medical conditions to
improve and be stabile enough for transfer to a less intense setting. Longer recovery
time suggests greater acuity among LTCH users. LTCH patients also have higher
average Charlson Comorbidity Index scores. The Charlson Comorbidity Index is a
measure of mortality risk based on a series of conditions that are present along side
patients’ acute hospital admission diagnosis. Each condition is assigned a score (1,
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2, 3, or 6) depending on the mortality risk associated with the condition [36].
LTCH patients, and especially patients treated in old LTCHs, have higher average
Charlson scores than other users of PAC. LTCH patients’ Charlson scores are most
comparable to patients treated in hospital-based SNFs and IRFs, further lending
support that these are the primary substitutes for LTCH care. Although averages
are higher among LTCH patients, the range of Charlson scores is very similar to
these facilities. The 25th and 75th percentile Charlson scores in LTCHs, hospital-
based SNFs and IRFs are 1 and 3. Thus, it appears that the types of patients (as
measured by their Charlson score) treated in these facilities are quite similar. On the
other hand, the table indicates that the distribution of Charlson scores is different
in freestanding SNFs and IRFs.
Table 2.7 characterizes LTCH, SNF, and IRF patient caseloads by patients’ acute
hospital admission diagnosis, again using the Major Diagnostic Categories. LTCH
patient caseloads are comprised of relatively many patients with Respiratory System
diagnoses (MDC 4), Skin and Tissue conditions (MDC 9), Infectious and Parasitic
conditions (MDC 18), and Injuries and Toxic Effect of Drugs (MDC 21). Interest-
ingly, only for the respiratory care specialty do patients in the corresponding MDCs
make up a larger percent of patient caseloads in LTCHs than for SNFs and IRFs. Pa-
tients in the rehabilitation specialty (MDCs 1, 8 and 23) comprise 23% of LTCH pa-
tients, which is lower than freestanding and hospital-based SNFs (42.7% and 39.9%,
respectively) and freestanding IRFs (67%). Mental health patients comprise between
0.4% and 0.7% of caseloads across all PAC settings.
Overall, the caseloads among LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs are surprisingly consistent.















































































































































































































































































































































































































cases. Although there are differences in ranking among the ten, these same diagnostic
categories account for between 93% and 96% of cases in other settings. More than
anything, similarity in caseload suggests that patients in these ten categories are
commonly treated in all PAC settings. Whether the treatment patients receive in
LTCHs is similar to treatment provided by SNFs and IRFs is a different question,
and is investigated below.
2.4.2 Inputs to Care
This section evaluates whether LTCHs provide more medically intense treatment,
and devote more skilled labor inputs to care than other PAC providers. The tables
compare use of nursing and therapy per certified bed, use of procedures during PAC
stays, and services offered by LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs.
To evaluate whether LTCH care is more medically intense than care provided by
SNFs and IRFs, we compare the use diagnostic and therapeutic procedures that are
provided during PAC stays at LTCH, SNFs and IRFs. Medical procedures reported
on patients’ claims are categorized into four groups using the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality’s definitions: Minor Diagnostic, Minor Therapeutic, Major
Diagnostic, and Major Therapeutic.5 Major Diagnostic and Therapeutic procedures
include any valid operating procedures, and thus indicate invasive procedures with
relatively high resource requirements.
Table 2.8 characterizes the use of these four classes of procedures across PAC
setting. Use of any type of procedure is more common in LTCHs overall than in other
PAC settings, and much more so compared to SNFs. All LTCH patients receive an
average of just under two procedures, while patients treated in old LTCHs receive an
5Available at: http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/procedure/procedure.jsp
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LTCHs FS SNF HB SNF FS IRF HB IRF
Acute Admission: MDC Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
1 Nervous System 8.2% 12.0% 7.3% 6.1% 13.8% 5.6%
2 Eye 0.1% 0.1%† 0.1%† 0.0%† 0.1%† 0.1%†
3
Ear,Nose, Mouth &
Throat 0.5% 0.9%† 0.4%† 0.3%† 0.1% 0.3%†
4 Respiratory System 22.5% 18.7% 12.4% 14.6% 6.7% 13.1%
5 Circulatory System 16.4% 18.3%† 16.6%† 16.4%† 12.6% 46.9%
6 Digestive System 9.7% 7.7% 9.1%† 9.3%† 4.0% 9.1%†
7
Hepatobiliary System &
Pancreas 1.2% 1.1%† 0.8% 1.0%† 0.4% 2.0%
8
Musculoskeletal System
& Connective Tissue 11.3% 17.5% 30.8% 29.7% 50.6% 7.3%
9
Skin, Subcutaneous
Tissue & Breast 6.4% 3.0% 2.6% 3.9% 1.3% 1.3%
10
Endocrine, Nutritional
& Metabolic System 3.6% 3.6%† 3.7%† 3.4% 1.7% 2.2%
11 Kidney & Urinary Tract 4.3% 3.6%† 4%† 3.6%† 1.8% 2.6%








Disorders 0.4% 0.6%† 0.2% 0.3%† 0.1% 0.3%†
18
Infectious & Parasitic
Diseases 6.7% 4.2% 2.9% 3.3% 1.3% 2.8%
19
Mental Diseases &




Disorders 0.1% 0.3%† 0.1%† 0.1%† 0.0% 0.1%†
21
Injuries, Poison, & Toxic
Effect of Drugs 1.5% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.7%
22 Burns 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%† 0.1%† 0.0% 0.1%†
23
Factors Influencing
Health Status 3.7% 3.2%† 4.6% 3.7%† 2.6% 2.3%
25 HIV Infection 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%†
Total Percent of Ten
Most Frequent MDCs in LTCHs 93% 92% 94% 94% 96% 93%
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF Claim files, 2004 POS file.
Note: No cases were found in MDC 14, 15 and 24. MDC 12 and 13 were combined.
FS=Freestanding HB=Hospital Based. Ten most frequent MDCs in LTCHs are (in order)
MDCs 4,5,8,6,1,18,9,11,23, and 10. † Statistics are not statistically different from All
LTCH statistics (5% level). Other statistics are.
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Table 2.8: Use and Type of Medical Procedures in PAC Settings
All LTCHs Old LTCHs FS SNFs HB SNFs FS IRFs HB IRFs
No. of Procedures
Mean 1.88 1.14 0.02 0.52 0.21 1.23
(SD) (1.85) (1.53) (0.22) (1.01) (0.76) (1.67)
25, 75%ile 0, 3 0, 2 0, 0 0, 1 0, 0 0, 2
Minor Diagnostic 19.2% 21.1% † 0.2% 1.9% 3.4% 25.1%
Minor Therapeutic 62.7% 41.2% 1.1% 24.5% 7.2% 30.5%
Major Diagnostic 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%
Major Therapeutic 10.3% 3.4% 0.0% 0.9% 0.2% 7.1%
Sample Size 8,842 1,096 7,262 15,368 13,872 12,993
Source: 2004 Medicare Inpatient and SNF Claim files, 2004 POS file.
Note: Old LTCHs include LTCHs operating before 1984.
Note: † Statistics are not statistically different from All LTCH statistics (5% level).
Other statistics are.
average of just over one procedure. Only hospital-based IRF patients receive more
than one procedure on average, and other patients are provided very few procedures.
This table suggests that LTCHs provide more intense treatment than other PAC
providers; however hospital-based IRF care is most similar. About 19% of LTCH
and 25% of hospital-based IRFs provided at least one Minor Diagnostic procedure,
while only about 1% of SNF patients and 3.4% of freestanding IRF patients receive
at least one such procedure. To contrast, about 60% of LTCH patients receive at
least one Minor Therapeutic procedure, compared to about 30% among hospital-
based SNF and hospital-based IRF patients, 7% of freestanding IRF patients and
1% of freestanding SNF patients. Use of Major Diagnostic and Therapeutic is much
lower across all settings, but patterns of use reflect the Minor categories. It does
not appear that perceived differences in medical intensity of treatment provided by
LTCHs and other PAC providers has been driven by old LTCHs. Old LTCHs have
lower intensity compared to LTCHs overall, and are more to other PAC providers
than LTCHs overall.
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Note that to the extent that SNFs and IRFs are less likely to report the use
of medical procedures than LTCHs because of differences in payment systems and
reporting requirements, these differences may be inflated.
To compare the labor inputs PAC providers devote to patient care, we consider
use of RNs, licensed practical or vocational nurses, physician assistants, as well as
Occupational, Physical, Speech and Respiratory therapists. Table 2.9 compares the
average, 25th and 75th percentile number of these personnel PAC providers employ,
per certified bed in their facilities.6
On average, LTCHs employ 0.41 RNs per bed, which translates to about 2.5 pa-
tients per nurse (assuming 100% occupancy). Consistent with what MedPAC found
through site visits, this is greater than the use of RNs in both freestanding and
hospital-based SNFs [27]. This is especially true among old LTCHs, who employ an
average of 0.66 RNs per bed. However, use of RNs in LTCHs is not significantly
greater than in freestanding IRFs. The 25th and 75th percentiles of RN use are also
comparable between LTCHs (all and old), hospital-based SNFs, and freestanding
IRFs, suggesting that even where there are differences in means, use of RNs is some-
what similar across PAC types. PAC providers use licensed practical or vocational
nurses and physician assistants at similar rates.
LTCHs also employ an average of 0.16 and 0.25 (all and old LTCHs) Respiratory
Therapists per certified beds (about 6.25 and 4 patients per therapist, respectively,
assuming 100% occupancy). Given LTCHs’ specialty in respiratory care, it is no
surprise that LTCHs use significantly more of this type of input than other PAC
providers. However, it is surprising that LTCH use of Occupational, Physical, and
6In Table 2.9 and 2.10, hospital-based IRFs are excluded from the comparison. Information about
facility characteristics about hospital-based IRFs is very limited in the POS file and does not include labor
or services offered.
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Table 2.9: Comparison of Inputs to Care
All LTCHs Old LTCHs FS SNFs HB SNFs FS IRFs
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
25, 75%ile 25, 75%ile 25, 75%ile 25, 75%ile 25, 75%ile
Nursing & Medical Staff: Per Bed
Registered Nurses 0.41 (0.7) 0.66 (1.87)† 0.15 (0.46) 0.33 (0.17) 0.36 (0.21)†
0.19, 0.47 0.19, 0.5 0.05, 0.17 0.22, 0.42 0.22, 0.45
Licensed Practical/
Vocational Nurses 0.22 (0.37) 0.32 (0.95)† 0.2 (0.22)† 0.24 (0.17)† 0.22 (0.55)†
0.07, 0.29 0.05, 0.24 0.08, 0.21 0.11, 0.34 0.08, 0.27
Physician Assistants 0.001 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01)† 0.002 (0.01)† 0.004 (0.02)
0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Therapy Staff: Per Bed
Occupational
Therapists 0.04 (0.15) 0.1 (0.43)† 0.03 (0.06)† 0.05 (0.04)† 0.15 (0.33)
0, 0.04 0.01, 0.04 0.02, 0.07 0.07, 0.18
Physical Therapists 0.04 (0.11) 0.1 (0.31)† 0.04 (0.11)† 0.06 (0.05) 0.21 (0.54)
0, 0.04 0.01, 0.09 0.01, 0.05 0.03, 0.08 0.08, 0.24
Speech Therapists 0.02 (0.06) 0.04 (0.16)† 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 0.08 (0.22)
0, 0.03 0, 0.02 0, 0.01 0, 0.02 0.03, 0.08
Respiratory
Therapists 0.16 (0.49) 0.25 (1.18)† n/a n/a 0.03 (0.04)
0.02, 0.19 0, 0.09 n/a n/a 0, 0.06
Source: 2004 POS file
Note: Old LTCHs include LTCHs operating before 1984.
Note: † Statistics are not statistically different from All LTCH statistics (5% level).
Other statistics are.
Speech Therapists is more in line with SNFs’ use, than with IRFs
since LTCH treatment for patients has been touted to be very focused on rehabil-
itation [27]. LTCHs and SNFs employ about one of each of these types of therapists
for every 25 patients, while IRFs assign between 4.75 and 12.5 patients per occupa-
tional, physical and speech therapist. Our findings on LTCHs’ use of nursing and
therapy in patients care are consistent with the literature on LTCHs [40]. (Note that
LTCH care may be more or less labor intensive with respect to physicians or other
medical personnel who are not measured in the POS file data.)
Finally, the services offered by LTCHs are compared to freestanding and hospital-
based SNFs and freestanding IRFs in Table 2.10. LTCHs offer a few services—
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hospice and dialysis—that are not typically found in other PAC settings. In general,
however, services offered by LTCHs closely resemble those offered by freestanding
IRFs. LTCHs in the old cohort, however, diverge in the services they offer: many
more old LTCHs, as compared to the overall rate, offer psychiatric services, and many
fewer offer dialysis and speech therapy. Here, data on the some services offered by
SNFs is limited to the presence of a special care unit. To the extent that SNFs
provide rehabilitative and respiratory care, hospice and dialysis outside of special
care units, these comparisons underestimate similarity between LTCHs and SNFs.
Overall, the comparison of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures suggests that
LTCH treatment is most similar to care provided by hospital-based IRFs, but is
more medically intense. LTCHs devote more nursing to patient care than other PAC
providers, but do not use more therapy. Treatment appears more medically intense
in LTCHs than freestanding and hospital-based SNFs; LTCHs provide more medical
procedures during stays, use more nursing in their patient care, but use comparable
amounts of therapy. Treatment appears slightly more medically intense in LTCHs
than in hospital-based IRFs; LTCHs provide more procedures, use more nursing in
their patient care, but care in LTCHs appears less rehabilitation focused than in
IRFs.
2.5 Market Comparison
Despite strong growth in the number of LTCHs over the last several years, LTCHs
remain unevenly located across the U.S. LTCHs are primarily located in the eastern
and southern regions. Regional concentration of LTCHs has left some states without
any LTCHs in operation, while several cities have multiple facilities. Recent research
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Table 2.10: Services Offered by LTCHs, SNFs, and IRFs
Services Offered All LTCHs Old LTCHs FS SNFs HB SNFs FS IRFs
Rehabilitation ‡ 83% 79%† 3% 4% 96%
Respiratory Care ‡ 97% 90%† 1% 1% 89%
Hospice ‡ 13% 21%† 1% 0% 5%
Dialysis ‡ 74% 28% 0% 0% 40%
Psychiatric Services 29% 97% 75% 58% 35%†
Physical Therapy 98% 97%† 99%† 100%† 100%†
Speech Therapy 96% 67% 97%† 97%† 99%†
Source: 2004 POS file
Note: For SNFs, providing the ‡ services is limited to the presence of a special care unit.
Note: † Statistics are not statistically different from All LTCH statistics (5% level).
Other statistics are.
on LTCHs has offered a few potential explanations for their uneven geographical
distribution. For example, regional variation in states’ Certificate of Need laws,
which regulate new construction of health care facilities and hospital bed conversion,
may make certain areas of the country more attractive for LTCH growth than others.
That these laws vary across states may encourage growth in some states and not in
others. LTCHs may also tend to cluster in larger metropolitan areas because there is
sufficient patient concentration to support LTCHs’ specialized services [22]. Indeed,
growth in LTCHs has not favored non-metropolitan areas.
This part of the analysis takes a closer look at the characteristics of the commu-
nities in which LTCHs are located. Beyond state regulations and population size,
LTCHs may choose a particular city over another because there is an underlying
health need they are able to address. If this were the case, we would expect LTCHs
to tend to locate in areas with either worse health characteristics, or specific health
characteristics, and lower concentrations of certain types of providers. We find that
LTCHs do not appear to locate in areas with particular patterns in health char-
acteristics. Rather, they appear to locate in areas with greater concentration of
hospitals and other PAC providers, but lower concentration of hospital-based PAC.
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These findings suggest that LTCHs locate where there is a greater propensity to use
certain types of acute and post-acute care, but where there are fewer providers of
hospital-based PAC services. LTCHs may address an unmet need for this type of
provider that is not expressed in population health characteristics.
Patterns in LTCH location with respect to concentration of health care providers
also provides insight into how LTCHs’ fit into the continuum of health care providers.
LTCHs may choose to locate in a particular city over another because there are many
of certain types of providers and few of others. Whereas the former suggests that
LTCHs play a complementary role, the latter suggests they are able to substitute
for (and compete with) other types of providers. We find that LTCHs locate in
areas of greater hospital concentration, which suggests LTCHs are complementary
to acute hospital care. Locating where there are many hospitals may also provide
a referral base of patients. That LTCHs locate in areas of greater concentration of
PAC providers, but fewer hospital-based providers suggests that they locate in areas
with greater propensity to use PAC in general, and fewer of providers whose services
they are able to replace. LTCHs may choose their locations with the intent of being
one of just a few suppliers of relatively intense PAC services. Moreover, hospital-
within-hospital LTCHs likely compete with other hospital-based providers for space
on acute hospital campuses.
2.5.1 Health Characteristics
If LTCHs tend to be located in areas with an underlying health need, we would
expect measures of LTCHs’ location to be associated with population markers for
health care need.
Table 2.11 presents three models testing the association between LTCHs’ location
and health and hospital stay characteristics among our sample of Medicare benefi-
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ciaries with at least one hospital stay in 2004. We use three different tests of this
association. First, Model 1 in Table 2.11 is an OLS model where the dependent
variable is log distance from all sample beneficiaries’ residence zip codes to the near-
est LTCH and the independent variables include beneficiary health and hospital stay
characteristics. Hospital stay characteristics reference beneficiaries’ first stay in 2004.
Additionally, we use the total number of admissions during 2004. There are 507,477
beneficiaries represented in the models. Second, Model 2 is a logistic regression where
the dependent variable indicates whether there are any LTCHs located within 100
miles of beneficiaries’ residence zip code. The odds ratios for the same set of indepen-
dent variables are presented. Finally, Model 3 is a Poisson regression model where
the number of LTCHs within 100 miles of beneficiary residence is regressed upon the
same set of independent variables. These three location measures are intended to
capture two interrelated components of LTCHs’ location decisions: the proximity of
LTCHs to beneficiaries, as well as the clustering of LTCHs near beneficiaries. We
are interested in whether LTCHs tend to locate and cluster nearer beneficiaries with
particular health and hospital stay characteristics. Table 2.1 presents descriptive
statistics on location measures.
Overall, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between population
health characteristics and LTCHs’ location. Although many regression coefficients
are precisely estimated, many coefficients are relatively small. This suggests that
there is only a weak practical relationship between LTCHs’ location and the health
and hospital stay characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries. That is, LTCHs do not
appear to locate closer to populations with markers of particular health needs or
greater disease severity. Moreover, LTCHs do not appear to locate in areas with
higher prevalence of hospital admissions in their areas of specialization.
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Table 2.11: Regression Models: Patient Health and Hospital Stay Characteristics and LTCH Loca-
tion
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OLS Model Logit Model Poisson Model
Log Distance One/More LTCHs No. LTCHs within
to Nearest LTCH within 100 Miles 100 Miles
Independent Variables Coeff. S.E. OR S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Age 0.00 0.00 *** 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ***
Patient Sex: Male 0.03 0.00 *** 0.96 0.01 ** -0.01 0.00 ***
Acute LOS 0.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ***
Current MCR Ent.: DI -0.10 0.01 *** 1.14 0.02 *** 0.03 0.00 ***
Original MCR Ent.: DI 0.12 0.01 *** 0.77 0.02 *** -0.04 0.00 ***
Current MCR Ent.: ESRD -0.04 0.04 0.76 0.12 * 0.00 0.01
Original MCR Ent.: ESRD -0.02 0.04 1.14 0.12 -0.01 0.01
Race: Black -0.61 0.01 *** 3.21 0.02 *** 0.13 0.00 ***
Race: Hispanic 0.13 0.01 *** 0.38 0.02 *** -0.20 0.00 ***
Race: Other -0.22 0.01 *** 0.72 0.03 *** -0.10 0.00 ***
Charlson Score 0.00 0.00 ** 1.01 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
No. Acute Admissions (2004) -0.01 0.00 *** 1.06 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 ***
Acute Admission: MDC
1 Nervous System 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 ***
2 Eye -0.10 0.04 * 0.96 0.11 0.07 0.01 ***
3 Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat -0.07 0.02 ** 1.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 *
5 Circulatory System -0.01 0.01 * 1.07 0.01 *** 0.01 0.00 ***
6 Digestive System -0.01 0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 ***
7
Hepatobiliary Sys. &
Pancreas 0.07 0.01 *** 0.85 0.03 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
8
Musculoskeletal System &
Connective Tissue 0.02 0.01 ** 0.91 0.02 *** -0.05 0.00 ***
9 Skin, Subcut. Tiss. & Brst -0.02 0.01 * 0.97 0.03 0.03 0.00 ***
10
Endocrine, Nutritional &
Metabolic System -0.03 0.01 ** 1.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 ***
11 Kidney & Urinary Tract -0.01 0.01 0.98 0.03 0.01 0.00 ***
12&13 Reproductive System 0.06 0.01 *** 0.87 0.04 *** -0.05 0.00 ***
16
Blood, Blood Forming
Organs & Immuno. Dis. -0.01 0.02 0.97 0.04 0.01 0.00 **
17
Myeloproliferative & Poorly
Differentiated Dis. -0.02 0.03 0.89 0.08 0.01 0.01
18 Infectious & Parasitic Dis. -0.04 0.01 1.12 0.03 ** 0.03 0.00 ***
19 Mental Diseases & Dis. -0.12 0.02 *** 1.02 0.05 -0.03 0.01 ***
20
Alcohol/Drug/Induced
Mental Dis. -0.17 0.03 *** 1.23 0.09 * 0.15 0.01 ***
21
Injuries, Poison, & Toxic
Effect of Drugs -0.05 0.02 ** 1.16 0.06 ** 0.01 0.01 *
22 Burns -0.07 0.09 1.12 0.24 0.04 0.02
23 Factors Infl. Health Status -0.10 0.01 *** 1.23 0.03 *** 0.00 0.00
24 Multiple & Sig. Trauma 0.34 0.33 0.70 0.78 -0.13 0.10
25 HIV Infection -0.50 0.09 *** 1.54 0.33 0.09 0.02 **
Source: 2004 Medicare Inpatient and SNF Claim files, 2004 POS file.
*** p-value <0.0001, ** p-value <0.01, * p-value<0.1
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For example, a one-year increase in age is associated with a 0.2% decline in the
distance to the nearest LTCH (Model 1), suggesting that LTCHs tend to locate nearer
slightly older populations (holding all else constant). Model 2 indicates no significant
relationship between age and beneficiaries’ likelihood of having any LTCHs within
100 miles. The Poisson model (Model 3) suggests that the number of LTCHs within
100 miles increases slightly with age: for each one-year increase in beneficiary age
we would expect to see 0.2% more LTCHs within 100 miles, holding other variables
constant. The average number of LTCHs within 100 miles is 8.6; a 0.2% increase in
the average number of LTCHs is equal to 0.017 LTCHs.
LTCHs appear to be located in areas where a higher percentage of Medicare bene-
ficiaries are female, minority (Race: Black and Race: Other), and fewer beneficiaries
eligible for Medicare through the Disability benefit. Beneficiary race has the strongest
relationships with LTCH location: Black beneficiaries and beneficiaries of other races
live closer to LTCHs than whites and hispanics; black beneficiaries are more likely to
have at least one LTCH within 100 miles; and, LTCHs appear to cluster nearer black
beneficiaries. The converse is true of hispanic beneficiaries: they tend to live further
from their nearest LTCHs, are less likely to have any LTCHs within 100 miles, and,
LTCHs do not appear to cluster in areas with more hispanic beneficiaries. Weaker
relationships can be seen between LTCH location and beneficiaries’ type of eligibility
for Medicare (the reference group are beneficiaries only eligible through the Aged and
Survivor benefit). Beneficiaries ever eligible through the Disability benefit tend to
live further from the nearest LTCH than Aged and Survivor beneficiaries. Consistent
with that, ever Disabled beneficiaries are less likely to have any LTCHs within 100
miles, and LTCHs do not appear to cluster in areas with more disabled beneficiaries.
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The negative association between distance to nearest LTCH and having ever been
eligible through the ESRD benefit is not statistically significant, but these benefi-
ciaries are less likely to have any LTCHs within 100 miles than Aged and Survivor
beneficiaries, and, holding all else constant, have an average of 2.3% fewer LTCHs
within 100 miles than the reference group.
Another dimension of population health needs includes markers for disease severity
among hospital users. If LTCHs locate where there is an underlying health need they
are able to address, they might be expected to locate in areas with greater disease
severity. To test this association, we consider the association between LTCH location
and beneficiaries’ acute hospital length of stay, Charlson Comorbidity Index score,
and the number of acute hospital admissions in 2004. We also test whether LTCHs
tend to locate near populations with diagnoses matching their specialties (respiratory
system conditions, rehabilitation-related conditions, and mental health conditions).
We use Liu’s classification of Major Diagnostic Categories into LTCH specialty areas,
and test whether LTCHs tend to locate near beneficiaries with hospital admission
diagnoses (grouped into Major Diagnostic Categories) in these specialty areas.7 If
LTCHs address an underlying health need in the communities where they locate, one
might expect LTCHs to choose communities where a relatively high proportion of
Medicare-covered acute hospital stays fall into these classes of medical conditions.
Measures of disease severity (acute hospital length of stay, Charlson Comorbidity
Score, and number of acute admissions in 2004) display a faint relationship with
LTCH location measures. These relationships suggest that LTCHs weakly favor areas
where Medicare beneficiaries experience longer, more complex, and more frequent
hospital stays. However, the practical significance of these associations is limited in
7The full set of MDCs are included in the model for completeness. The reference category is Circulatory
System conditions.
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that stays are longer only by a fraction of a day on average, only minimally more
complex, and occur only slightly more often.
LTCHs also do not appear to systematically locate near patients with acute hos-
pital admissions related to the LTCH specialty areas. They tend to locate in areas
with slightly lower rates of respiratory system conditions (MDC 4); beneficiaries with
these conditions are slightly less likely to have any LTCHs within 100 miles, and,
among those with any LTCHs within 100 miles, there tend to be fewer. The refer-
ence group includes beneficiaries with Circulatory System conditions (MDC 5). The
same associations can be found in two of the three rehabilitation specialty MDCs
(Nervous System conditions (MDC 1) and Musculoskeletal System and Connective
Tissue (MDC 8)). Only for Factors Influencing Health Status (MDC 23, in the re-
habilitation specialty), and the mental health specialty (MDC 19) do LTCHs tend
to be located nearer beneficiaries with these conditions. Holding all else constant,
beneficiaries with these conditions live 9% and 11% closer to the nearest LTCH, re-
spectively. Beneficiaries with conditions in MDC 23 are 16% more likely than the
reference group to have at least one LTCH within 100 miles, but LTCHs do not
appear to cluster near beneficiaries with either condition.
2.5.2 Concentration of Health Care Providers
If LTCHs tend to be located in areas with an underlying health need that LTCHs
are able to address, we would expect LTCH location to be negatively associated with
other types of health care providers that address those health needs. This section
presents the association of LTCH location with concentration of different types of
health care providers.
To evaluate whether LTCHs are attracted to areas with higher or lower concen-
tration of other health care providers, we estimated regression models of association
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between provider concentration and measures of LTCHs’ location. LTCHs’ presence
is measured with the LTCH share of total PAC beds and the LTCH share of PAC
stays in a statistical area.8 Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics on these measures.
Rather than using the raw number of physicians, hospitals, and PAC providers, we
use physicians per aged person, hospitals per 1,000 aged persons, and PAC providers
per 1,000 aged persons. Population estimates are from 2002. There are 318 statisti-
cal areas represented in each model. Models 4 and 5 use the full set of independent
variables in regressions with the two market share variables, share of beds and share
of stays. Models 6 and 7 use an abbreviated set of independent variables with the
two market share variables.
The multivariate models presented in Table 2.12 suggest that LTCHs locate in
areas with greater concentration of some types of hospitals, PAC providers, and
physicians. These patterns suggest that LTCHs tend to locate in areas with greater
propensity to use non-general inpatient services and PAC services. There may be
health needs in these communities that LTCHs are able to address (that were not cap-
tured in the above analysis). On the other hand, communities with greater propensity
to use certain types of services may be financially lucrative.
LTCHs tend to be located in areas with higher concentrations of some types
of hospitals. Although there is a negative association (not significant) with short-
term general hospitals, LTCHs tend to locate where there are more short-term non-
general hospitals, all types of long-term hospitals, and chronic disease hospitals.
This relationship can be seen in Models 4 and 5, modeling the two measures of
LTCH market share (beds and stays) with provider concentration. The positive
association of LTCH location with hospital concentration is not surprising given
8Total PAC beds is the sum of SNF (Medicare-only), IRF, and LTCH beds.
43
a few characteristics of LTCHs. Growth in LTCHs has been concentrated among
the hospitals-within-hospitals and it is not surprising that LTCHs would cluster in
areas with greater opportunity to locate on hospital campuses. Moreover, LTCHs
rely on hospitals in their communities (hosts or otherwise) to provide a referral
base of patients. The majority of LTCH admissions come from hospitals and other
institutional settings, rather than from the community. LTCHs in areas with lower
hospital concentrations may be uncomfortably dependent on a few referral sources.
The relationship between LTCHs’ location and other PAC providers appears to
be mixed. For many types of providers (SNFs, hospital-based SNFs, IRFs, nursing
facilities, and hospice providers), the association with LTCHs’ share of PAC beds
is positive, while the association with LTCHs’ share of PAC stays is negative, or
vice-versa. In many cases, the results are not significant at conventional levels.
Nevertheless, LTCHs do appear to have the strongest market share in areas with
greater concentration of IRFs (Models 5 and 7) and Home Health providers (Model
6). This suggests that LTCHs locate in areas where there is greater propensity to
use these kinds of services.
Finally, LTCHs market share appears to be negatively associated with the total
number of physicians per elderly person, but positively associated with the number
of specialists per elderly person (Models 4 and 6). Again, it appears that LTCHs
tend to locate in areas with greater propensity to use specialized services.
2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this analysis was to assess how similar LTCHs are to other PAC
providers and to identify market characteristics related to LTCHs’ location. We find





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































would suggest, but do differ in some important ways from more conventional PAC
providers. Despite these differences, it appears that LTCHs replace services that
would have been delivered by other PAC providers. Finally, our results suggest that
LTCHs may address an unmet health need in the communities where they locate.
The comparison of patient caseloads and inputs to care among LTCHs, SNFs
and IRFs suggests that patients treated in LTCHs are similar to patients treated in
other PAC settings, and treatment is not as different from other providers as the
literature on LTCHs would suggest. Patients appear to have higher disease severity
than patients using SNFs and IRFs, but caseloads are surprisingly consistent across
PAC setting. This consistency suggests that LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs treat patients
with similar clinical needs. However, the inputs-to-care analysis suggests that LTCH
treatment is more medically intense than care in other settings, but less rehabilitation
focused.
Comparison of markets with and without LTCHs in operation indicates that
LTCHs may address an unmet need in the communities where they locate. LTCHs
tend to be located in areas with greater concentration of hospitals and some types
of PAC services. These areas appear to have greater propensity to use acute and
post-acute services. Greater propensity to use acute and post-acute services does not
appear to be systematically related to the health characteristics among Medicare ben-
eficiaries, but, unmet need may not express itself through the health characteristics
measured here.
There is strong evidence that LTCHs substitute for hospital-based SNFs and
hospital-based IRFs. Comparison of PAC utilization patterns in markets with LTCHs
to all markets indicates that there is a trade-off between LTCH utilization and uti-
lization of hospital-based SNF and IRFs. That LTCHs tend to located in markets
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with fewer hospital-based PAC providers also supports this notion. LTCHs may
choose to locate where markets are not saturated with other providers of relatively
intense PAC, where there are fewer competitors for both space in acute hospitals for
their operations (for hospitals-within-hospitals) and patients to admit for care.
There are important policy implications of greater similarity and substitution
between LTCHs and other PAC services than was previously believed. Fairness dic-
tate that providers, who treat similar types of patients, provide relatively similar
treatment and appear to substitute for each other, ought to be reimbursed and regu-
lated in a similar fashion. This study finds the greatest substitution among LTCHs,
hospital-based SNFs and hospital-based IRFs. The greatest similarity in treatment
was found between LTCHs and hospital-based IRFs. Whereas current policy re-
imburses and regulates LTCHs separately from all SNFs and all IRFs, this study
suggests that it may be more appropriate to consistently reimburse and regulate
LTCHs, hospital-based SNFs and hospital-based IRFs together.
In conclusion, this analysis presents a comparison of LTCH, SNF and IRF oper-
ations and the local market characteristics of LTCHs’ location. The purpose of this
analysis is to identify similarities in patients and operations. These similarities can
be used to inform future Medicare policy on how PAC providers are regulated and
reimbursed.
CHAPTER III
Long-Term Care Hospitals under Prospective Payment: Do
Medicare’s Payment Rules Affect how Hospitals Respond?
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades, Long-Term Care Hospitals (LTCHs) have emerged as an impor-
tant alternative provider to short-term hospitals for lengthy inpatient stays. LTCHs
have benefited from the growing reliance on post-acute services by Medicare bene-
ficiaries. The number of LTCHs increased from about 80 in the early 1980s to 375
in 2005 and Medicare outlays increased from $1.7 billion in 1999 to $4.6 billion in
2005. [29]. While LTCHs were able to thrive under cost-based reimbursement much
longer than most health care providers, rapid growth in Medicare outlays to LTCHs
during the 1990s prompted similar payment system reforms used in the Medicare
program for other providers. This study considers how LTCHs have changed their
practices under prospective payment. The Medicare prospective payment system
used to reimburse LTCHs (LTCH-PPS) differs fundamentally from other Medicare
payment systems in that hospitals must qualify for the special LTCH payment rates.
This eligibility criterion alters the financial incentives facing LTCHs. Of interest
in this analysis is whether differing financial incentives among LTCHs drives vary-
ing responses to prospective payment. Understanding how practice patterns differ




Long-Term Care Hospitals are specialty care providers, primarily serving long-
staying patients with complex medical conditions. The Medicare program defines
them as accredited acute care hospitals with average lengths of stay (LOS) above 25
days. Since the inception of the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) for
short-term hospitals in the early 1980s, Medicare has maintained a separate payment
system for LTCHs and required that hospitals qualify as LTCHs. At the time of IPPS
implementation, it was believed that paying these hospitals the same payment rates
as short-term hospitals would threaten their financial viability and ability to treat
patients with the appropriate treatment intensity [20]. For this reason, qualifying as
an LTCH excludes the hospital from the Medicare IPPS.
Because Medicare has used unique mechanisms to govern payment to LTCHs,
their payment system offers a good setting with which to study certain nuances of
financial incentives. The Medicare payment system for LTCHs consists of two compo-
nents. The first component is the system’s reimbursement methodology. Beginning
in October 2002, payment for LTCH services changed from cost-based reimbursement
to a prospective system, paying predetermined rates for each hospital stay accord-
ing to patient and hospital characteristics. The LTCH-PPS uses many of the same
Diagnosis-Related Groups as the IPPS to characterize patients, but reimburses at
different rates. The second component of LTCHs’ payment system is the requirement
that hospitals qualify as LTCHs. To qualify, hospitals must maintain an average LOS
above 25 days; this threshold is henceforth referred to as the LOS criterion. A hospi-
tal may lose its eligibility to the LTCH payment rates if its average LOS falls below
25 days and would be reimbursed for inpatient stays according to the IPPS payment
rates. Average LOS is assessed at the end of each LTCH’s fiscal year. In 2003, the
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difference between base payment rates in the IPPS and the LTCH-PPS was about
$30,000 [1] [2]. This large difference in payment rates reflects the relative costliness
of LTCH care. Moreover, the difference in payment rates provides a strong incentive
for LTCHs to remain eligible for the LTCH payment rates.
It is the combination of prospective payment and the LOS criterion which create
potentially different responses to the same incentive structure among LTCHs. On one
hand, prospective payment breaks the link between reimbursement and incurred costs
and gives providers an incentive to provide cost-effective care. Reducing treatment
intensity and providing shorter inpatient stays are methods by which hospitals can
maximize the difference between patient revenue and treatment costs. On the other
hand, the LOS criterion rewards providing longer stays, essentially requiring hospitals
to devote a minimum amount of resources to each patient stay. The penalty to
not providing long enough stays is significantly lower payment rates in the future.
Depending on a facility’s average LOS, one of the two payment system components
will factor more prominently in decision-making. One LTCH, for example, may have
a sufficiently high average LOS to effectively ignore its interest in maintaining its
LTCH status. This LTCH could be expected to behave as hospitals have in the
past under prospective payment, reducing the resources devoted to patient care.
When an LTCH’s status is threatened with a low facility average LOS, however, the
facility may choose to devote more resources to patient care than would be optimal
from its perspective under prospective payment alone. That is, the facility interest
of maintaining its LTCH status may override the incentive to minimize costs in
treatment decisions.
The incentive effects of this type of payment system structure have only begun
to be studied. The facility-level LOS criterion for LTCHs is unique among Medicare
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payment systems, but it is one of a few threshold parameters currently being used in
payment systems. Two salient examples of threshold parameters in payment systems
include Medicare’s payment system for therapy in the Skilled Nursing Facility PPS
and Pay-for-Performance thresholds for quality indicators. Under the first, Medicare
reimburses SNFs for therapy in blocks of time (45-149 minutes, 150-324 minutes,
etc per week); in the second, many Pay-for-Performance systems reward provider
groups with bonuses or higher payment rates for meeting certain performance targets
(cervical cancer screening, mammography, and HbA1C levels among diabetics, for
example). The common theme among these systems is that there is a financial
incentive to meet the threshold, but no financial incentive to go beyond it until
there is an additional financial reward. SNFs have very weak financial incentive
to provide more therapy than the ‘theshold amount’, unless the patient can meet
the next threshold. Under Pay-for-Performance, provider groups have no financial
incentive to improve quality of care after meeting a performance target. In the case
of the LTCH payment system, we argue that LTCHs have a strong incentive to
provide stays averaging 25 days in order to maintain their LTCH status, but have
no incentive to provide additional days of care. Doing so would reduce profits under
prospective payment.
To help interpret changes in financial incentives facing LTCHs, we develop a model
of hospital behavior in which the hospital administrator chooses a level of treatment
intensity to jointly maximize profits and quality of care while operating under a
model of the payment system facing LTCHs. Treatment intensity represents the
resources LTCHs devote to patient care to maintain a particular average LOS. This
model payment system incorporates the IPPS as an alternative set of payment rates
by allowing the fixed portion of payment for each stay to vary step-wise with the
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hospital’s overall choice of treatment intensity. The model shows that for different
levels of initial treatment intensity, some administrators would choose to increase
intensity under prospective payment, while others would decrease intensity.
The empirical analysis uses the implementation of prospective payment to LTCHs
and baseline facility average LOS as sources of variation in financial incentives fac-
ing providers. LTCHs are grouped according to baseline average LOS to represent
groups facing three different incentives. First, LTCHs with a baseline average LOS
below 25 days face a binding LOS criterion and are directly at risk for losing access
to LTCH payment rates. Second, LTCHs with baseline average LOS between 25 and
32 days form a group which is not directly at risk for losing access to the LTCH pay-
ment rates, but is expected to factor long-term access into decision-making. Third,
LTCHs with baseline averages above 32 days may have sufficiently high averages
that the LOS criterion plays only a minor role in decision-making. The hypothesis
is that the three groups, facing different financial incentives, will respond differently
under prospective payment. Those at risk of losing eligibility are expected to in-
crease treatment intensity, despite prospective payment. All LTCHs above the LOS
criterion are expected to respond to prospective payment by shortening stays, but
LTCHs with baseline averages between 25 and 32 days are expected to shorten stays
less than LTCHs with baseline averages above 32 days. Descriptive results on the
change in average LOS in each of the three LTCH groups are presented. Then, OLS
models of patient length of stay are estimated to isolate the policy response from
other factors impacting LOS. The primary threat to identification, regression to the
mean, is discussed.
LTCHs appear to respond to the change in payment system as hypothesized.
Prospective payment is associated with a 5.7 day decline in average LOS among
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LTCHs with baseline averages above 32 days. This response is similar to that of
short-term hospitals when the IPPS was introduced. LTCHs with baseline averages
between 25 and 32 days appear to protect their eligibility to the LTCH-PPS payment
rates: in this group, prospective payment is associated with a shortening of patient
stays, but to a much smaller extent (1.6 days on average) than LTCHs with higher
baseline averages. LTCHs with baseline averages below 25 days, those which are
directly at risk for losing eligibility, experience an increase in average LOS over the
study period, but this cannot wholely be attributed to prospective payment.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
3 develops the conceptual model of administrator choice of treatment intensity and
develops several hypotheses. Section 4 and 5 detail the empirical strategy and present
the results. Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes.
3.2 Previous Research
This study builds on three strains of research. First, very little has been published
on LTCHs, their role in markets for post-acute care and how Medicare payment rules
affect their practices. This study establishes that the mechanism by which Medicare
has differentiated LTCHs from other acute care hospitals does affect their practice
patterns. Second, this study expands upon traditional models of provider decision-
making under supply-side cost sharing to model the payment system facing LTCHs.
Finally, this study adds to the established empirical literature on how health care
providers alter their resource use under prospective payment. Unlike most studies,
this study considers how the response to prospective payment differs among hospitals.
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3.2.1 Background on LTCHs
LTCHs provide extensive rehabilitation and medical treatment to a vulnerable
patient population. LTCHs can be an appropriate post-acute setting for patients for
whom short-term hospitals are no longer a cost-effective option, but require a higher
level of care than is generally available in conventional settings. Most LTCH patients
are admitted after an acute hospital discharge, and often from intensive care units,
rather than from the community.
As with other post-acute settings, LTCH stays following an acute hospital stay are
relatively common among patients with stroke with infarction, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, heart failure and shock, hip replacement, septicemia, and tra-
cheotomy with ventilator support [26]. Unlike patients treated in other post-acute
settings, LTCH patients often suffer from complex medical conditions. Many LTCH
patients require ventilator care for respiratory failure, have multiple organ failure,
neuromuscular damage, infectious disease, or require extended wound care. Liu et al.
(2001) showed that among LTCHs in operation in 1997, most had high proportions
of cases with respiratory- and/or rehabilitation-related diagnoses. Few LTCHs had
significant caseloads outside of these two categories.
The oldest LTCHs have origins as tuberculosis and chronic disease hospitals and
were primarily located in the northeastern U.S. The oldest LTCHs still operating
tend to be freestanding, government-run or non-profit facilities. Newer LTCHs tend
to be affiliated with corporate hospital chains, and are often co-located on another
hospital’s campus (the so-called ‘hospitals-within-hospitals’). Most of the growth in
LTCHs has occurred in the Northeast and the South, and among ‘hospitals-within-
hospitals’ [22].
It has been suggested that some LTCHs resemble short stay hospitals in the
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intensity of care provided and tend to specialize in treating conditions requiring
longer term, relatively intense post-acute care. MedPAC found that among likely
users of LTCH services, patients with LTCH stays had hospital stays that were an
average of 9 days shorter than the stays of patients without subsequent LTCH stays.
Other LTCHs, on the other hand, are thought to more closely resemble skilled nursing
facilities in patient type and intensity of care provided. Skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs) are the principle alternative to LTCH care. MedPAC found that the use of
LTCHs was associated with a one-third reduction in the likelihood of having a stay
at a freestanding SNF [27].
Chapter 2 of this dissertation found that LTCHs admit patients with somewhat
higher average severity than other PAC providers, but appear to treat similar types
of patient and substitute for hospital-based skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and in-
patient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs). Treatment intensity appears to be higher in
LTCHs, but use of nursing and therapy, with the exception of inhalation therapy,
are in line with SNFs’ and IRFs’. Unlike other post-acute care providers, LTCHs are
said to engage in significant patient screening before admission [27]. Screening and
selection of patients may enable LTCHs to target admissions those most appropri-
ately treated in LTCHs, or to alter their patient populations with changing financial
incentives.
3.2.2 Models of Provider Decision-Making
The model of provider choice of intensity developed in Section 3 builds on models
provider decision-making under supply-side cost sharing developed in the optimal
payment system literature. This section briefly outlines two payment system effects
developed in optimal payment systems literature: the moral hazard effect and the
selection effect.
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Until the early-1980s nearly all providers in the U.S. were reimbursed on the
basis of incurred costs. Then, beginning with short-term hospitals, the Medicare
program began to reimburse on a prospective basis. Most private insurers have
followed suit over the last 20 years and Medicare has introduced prospective payment
systems to several different types of providers. Under prospective payment, payment
is determined according to the Diagnosis-Related Group within which each patient
falls and, in general, does not increase with each service provided. By paying only
a pre-determined amount, prospective payment requires the provider to bear the
marginal costs of treatment. While providers keep any difference between payment
and treatment costs, they must also bear any financial loss. This kind of supply-side
cost sharing gives a cost-control mechanism to providers: because each additional
service provided to patients reduces net revenues, providers have a financial interest
in being cost-effective in their treatment decisions. The main issue with this type
of payment system is the degree to which the quantity of treatment is affected by
supply-side cost sharing, and whether the amount of care provided is more or less
than optimal from the social perspective.
The moral hazard effect of prospective payment is the incentive to provide fewer
treatment services in order to protect net revenues. Ellis and McGuire argue that,
when forced to bear the marginal cost of treatment, providers who put less weight
on patient benefits than on profits, will tend to undersupply treatment relative to
the social optimum (where the marginal benefit of treatment is equal to its marginal
cost). The moral hazard effect gives rise to the hypothesis that hospitals will provide
fewer inpatient days to a given patient when reimbursed under a prospective payment
system than when reimbursement is based directly on the exact services provided.
A second effect of prospective payment is that of selection. Ma (1994) demon-
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strates that prospective payment introduces the incentive to hospitals to change the
average severity of treated patients by avoiding certain patients. Because providers
face non-systematic risk (the risk that a patient will be costlier than the typical
patient falling into the same diagnosis group), providers have a strong incentive to
attract low-severity patients and avoid relatively severe cases [23]. Providers drawing
a favorable selection of patients win at the expense of those left treating high-cost
patients [31]. Providers also face systematic risk (the risk that a patient will fall into
a diagnosis group for which the provider’s average treatment costs exceed the fixed
payment). For this reason, providers may do best by avoiding patients with medi-
cal conditions for which they lack a cost advantage, and instead target admissions
among patients in relatively cost-advantageous groups [8]. Dranove suggests that this
force will drive hospitals to specialize in treating certain types of medical conditions.
Avoiding certain types of patients, or patient ‘dumping’, can take on various forms.
For example, hospitals may choose not to provide a particular specialized service
because doing so would attract a relatively severe and costly patient population [9].
The selection effect of prospective payment gives rise to the hypothesis that access
to care among certain types of patients may suffer under prospective payment.
3.2.3 Empirical Work on PPS
LTCHs are one of the last types of providers for which the Medicare program
has introduced prospective payment. Many researchers and policy analysts have
considered the effects of prospective payment in acute care hospitals and post-acute
settings. These studies have documented both the direct and indirect effects of
prospective payment, considering the change in resources devoted to patient care,
the effects on quality of care and patient outcomes, access to care, as well as changes
in the health care industry. Coulam and Gaumer (1991) offer a comprehensive review
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of the literature on the effects of prospective payment among acute care hospitals
after the first several years of implementation. We focus on hospitals’ PPS experi-
ence, rather than the more recent experience among PAC providers, because there
is greater similarity in payment system parameters with acute hospitals.
As the moral hazard effect would predict, prospective payment is associated with a
one-time large reduction in the length of acute hospital stays. Studies found prospec-
tive payment was associated with a one-day decline in length of stay, a much stronger
decline than the trend before implementation [37]. After this initial effect, length of
stay moderated. Average patient complexity increased over the first several years of
PPS; it is possible that LOS continued to decline among patients with comparable
complexity to early-PPS patients. But, because many studies cannot differentiate
patient severity within the diagnostic class, this has not been established. These
results are consistent across all acute care non-exempt hospitals and across patient
groups [7]. Thus, the incentive structure of Medicare’s IPPS did not elicit funda-
mentally different responses to prospective payment across hospitals.
Whether the observed reductions in resource use are desirable from a social per-
spective depends on how the quality of care, and in turn, health outcomes are af-
fected. If hospitals choose to reduce unnecessary or ineffective treatment, patient
outcomes will not suffer as those services would have provided little patient benefit.
In reducing the resources devoted to patient care, however, there is no guarantee
that beneficial, but costly, services would not go unprovided. Without the provision
of these services, patient outcomes are likely to suffer.
On the whole, studies of the first several years after PPS implementation find that
the possible negative effects of prospective payment are not sufficiently consistent or
large to be detected by commonly used measures of patient outcomes [7]. In partic-
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ular, with respect to patient mortality, studies found either no change or declines in
in-hospital mortality rates, longer-term rates (30-days to 120-days), and population
mortality rates. There is some evidence that the location of death shifted from the
hospital to post-acute settings and the community. Patient mortality is, admittedly,
a crude device for measuring changes in quality of care and may not be sufficiently
sensitive to pick up subtle changes. Moreover, it is possible that quality of care is
less affected by the form of payment than by the level of payment. Pre-post studies
of the effect of prospective payment are not likely to detect this relationship.
3.3 Conceptual Model
In this section, we present a simple one-payer model of hospital behavior, where
a decision maker chooses a level of treatment intensity in light of the financial in-
centives it faces. This model is similar to others developed to illustrate the effect of
provider-side cost-sharing on provider behavior [10] and [15], but reflects the pay-
ment system facing LTCHs. Payment for each patient stay is modeled as a linear
combination of a fixed component, determined by patient characteristics and the
facility’s choice of treatment intensity, as well as a variable component, reflecting
incurred treatment costs. The intensity of patient care is assumed to be under the
control of the hospital and represents the resources a hospital devotes to patient
care to maintain a particular average LOS. We show that when an eligibility crite-
rion accompanies prospective payment, both aspects of the payment system affect a
hospital’s choice over resources devoted to patient care.
The administrator’s utility is a function of both profits and the quality of care
Q(I) provided, with γ representing the weight (between 0 and 1) placed on profits.
Quality of care is an increasing function of treatment intensity, I. Profits, measured
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as the difference between revenue R and costs C(I) across all patients X, are de-
creasing in treatment intensity for a given α. The hospital administrator maximizes
utility by choosing a level of intensity to jointly maximize profits and quality of care,
each weighted to reflect the administrator’s altruism. Administrator decision making
reflects the choices of several different agents including the medical board, board of
directors, managers, owners, etc.
The key equations of the model are the following:
max U(I) = U(π(I), Q(I), γ) (3.1)
s.t. U(π, Q, γ) = X[γπ + (1− γ)Q(I)] (3.2)
π = (R− C(I)) (3.3)
R = α(I) + βC(I) where α > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (3.4)
C = C(I) where C ′ > 0 (3.5)
Q = Q(I) where Q′ > 0 (3.6)
αj =
 αH if I∗ > I,αL if I∗ ≤ I. (3.7)
Each Hospital earns revenue per patient stay (R) equal to the sum of the fixed
component α and the portion of incurred cost βC(I) reimbursed by the system.
Because α > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, this system is a mixed payment system. In this
model, the fixed component of payment α each hospital earns is determined by its
choice of treatment intensity: hospitals maintaining an average length of stay above
the eligibility threshold I earn a high fixed payment αH while those with choice of
treatment intensity below I earn the low fixed payment αL. The threshold I, αH
and αL create a step-wise payment system analogous to the payment system facing
LTCHs where αH represents special payment rates available to hospitals qualifying as
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LTCHs, and αL represents payment rates under the alternative IPPS. The treatment
intensity-dependent fixed component of payment differentiates this model from other
models where all hospitals earn the same fixed payment per discharge for a given
patient and diagnosis.
This model considers the decision making of just one hospital, paid under a single
payment system for care provided to identical patients. This model does not incorpo-
rate a demand response to its choice of treatment intensity, and so does not consider
the effect of its choice of treatment intensity on competition with other hospitals.
Any possible economies of scale are ignored. The mechanism for altering a hospital’s
choice of treatment intensity, whether by treating a given set of patients differently
or by changing the population of patients treated, is left to the empirical analysis.
3.3.1 Choice of Treatment Intensity
The choice for a provider paid under this payment system will be to reduce, main-
tain or increase treatment intensity from an initial level in order to maximize hospital
administrator utility. We use the the utility maximization problem 3.1 to show how
the choice of treatment intensity affects utility when the fixed component of payment
depends on the choice of intensity. We then consider specific scenarios and develop
several hypotheses for providers’ choice of intensity under varying circumstances.
Profits earned by each hospital are given by equation 3.3 where total profits are
the difference between revenue and costs across all patients. Substituting equations
3.4 and 3.5 into equation 3.2 yields equation 3.8.
U = X[γ(α− (1− β)C(I)) + (1− γ)Q(I)] (3.8)
The utility function implies that hospital administrator’s choice of intensity de-
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pends on the generosity of the payment system, treatment costs, as well as the
relative weights given to profits and quality of care. Increasing treatment intensity
increases payment through a possible change in α and through the increase in costs,
βC(I). Hospital profits increase under two conditions. First, profits increase when
an increase in intensity brings about an increase in the payment level, α, and this
increase more than offsets higher treatment costs borne by the hospital ((1−β)C(I)).
Second, profits increase when a decrease in intensity brings about a decrease in fixed
payments, and the cost savings from the intensity reduction more than offsets the
decrease in the fixed payment. In either case, the change in α less the change in
(1 − β)C) is positive and profits increase. The utility problem requires that the
administrators’ desire for profits be balanced against preferences for quality of care.
Changes to treatment intensity do not necessarily affect quality of care and profits
in the same way. The administrator will alter treatment intensity consistent with
the joint maximization of profits and quality of care.
Two payment system effects can be derived from the utility function. First, the
derivative of equation 3.8 with respect to intensity is X[(1− γ)Q′ − (1− β)C ′]. The
moral hazard effect,(1− β)C ′ is common to other models of hospital behavior under
supply-side cost sharing and captures the incentive to provide less treatment intensity
when the hospital must bear the marginal cost of treatment. Second, the potential
for changes in I to change α introduces the payment level effect. Since α depends
on the hospital’s choice of treatment intensity, there is an incentive to choose a level
of intensity which maximizes the fixed component of payment relative to treatment
costs.
Possible responses to the payment system can be illustrated by comparing utility
under two choices of treatment intensity, I1 and I2, for a given number of discharges
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X, where I2 > I1. Recall that C
′(I) > 0 so C(I2) > C(I1). A hospital would choose
one level of intensity over another if utility is higher under that choice. We describe
the effect of choice of intensity on profits and consider the effect of quality. Equations
3.9 through 3.11 are equivalent.
U(I1) ≷ U(I2) (3.9)
X[γ(α1 − (1− β)C(I1)) + (1− γ)Q(I1)] ≷ X[γ(α2 − (1− β)C(I2)) + (1− γ)Q(I2)]
(3.10)





Case I: I < I1 < I2.
If I < I1 < I2 then α1 = α2 = αH . The hospital would not earn a higher fixed
payment by providing I2. The right-hand side of equation 3.11 is equal to the effect
on quality from a change in intensity from I1 to I2, weighted by the ratio of weights
given to quality and profits, while the left hand side is equal to the change in a
hospital’s treatment cost from I1 to I2. Providers would choose to provide the I1
level of intensity if the reduction in treatment costs over I2 are greater than the
weighted reduction in quality of care. For example, if a hospital gives zero weight
to the quality of care provided, then a reduction in intensity from I2 to I1 would
unambiguously be made because profits are greater under I1 than I2.
Case II: I1 < I and I2 > I
If I1 < I and I2 > I then α1 = αL and α2 = αH . Again, comparing U(I1) and U(I2),
it is clear that C(I2) − C(I1) > 0, α2 − α1 > 0 and Q(I2) − Q(I1) > 0 in equation
3.11.
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A hospital would choose I1 if U(I1) > U(I2). This is true only when the difference
in costs borne by the hospital is greater than the difference in payment and weighted
quality. A hospital with initial choice of intensity I2 would choose to reduce intensity
only if the cost savings from the reduction were greater than the resulting decrease
in both payments and weighted quality. For a hospital giving zero weight to quality,
such a decrease to intensity must increase profits to be worthwhile from the hospital’s
perspective.
Alternatively, a hospital would choose I2 over I1 if U(I2) > U(I1). This is true
when increases in payment and weighted quality are greater than the necessary in-
crease in treatment costs. In this case, the right-hand side of equation 3.11 must be
greater than the left-hand side. For an initial treatment intensity choice I1, such an
increase is likely given that both payment and quality of care would increase under
I2.
The choice of intensity is a facility-level one: the hospital administrator sees that if
average LOS is above I, then the fixed payment earned on each patient stay would be
αH . The hospital administrator may choose to incur greater costs treating patients in
order to raise the hospital’s fixed payment in the future. Doing so would also improve
the quality of care.There is no financial return to providing a level of intensity above
I. The relative weights given to quality and profit will help determine how far above
or below I an intensity an administrator chooses. The larger the weight given to
profit, the larger the reduction in intensity (and quality of care) an administrator
will tolerate for a given increase in profit. To increase average LOS, the administrator
can alter the hospital’s treatment policy by keeping typical patients longer, and alter
the admission policy to admit longer-staying patients.
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3.3.2 Model Predictions and Hypotheses
This model offers several predictions relevant to the introduction of the prospec-
tive payment system for LTCHs. First, a hospital with initial choice of treatment
intensity greater than I, all else equal, has an incentive to reduce intensity toward
the point where further reduction would result in an unprofitable change in fixed
payments. The main effect of the LOS criterion is to temper reductions in treatment
intensity under prospective payment by creating a financial disincentive to providing
too few days of care. As in other models, concern for quality moderates the financial
incentive to reduce treatment intensity. The first study hypothesis is that while all
LTCHs with baseline average LOS above the LOS criterion will reduce treatment
intensity and shorten stays, LTCHs relatively close to the LOS criterion will make
smaller reductions to intensity. As described in the next section, LTCHs with baseline
averages above 25 days are divided into two groups. LTCHs with baseline average
LOS above 32 days (the High group) are expected to have a relatively strong policy
response to prospective payment with the largest reduction in the average number of
days provided. LTCHs with baseline averages between 25 and 32 days (the Middle
group) are expected to protect their long-term access to the LTCH-PPS payment
rates and make smaller changes to the number of days they provide.
The model suggests different behavior among providers whose initial choice of
treatment intensity is below I. All else equal, a hospital can be expected to increase
intensity when doing so will increase profits. Profits would increase if the difference
in payments between the two choices exceeds the difference in treatment costs. Ad-
ministrators’ interest in quality of care can amplify this effect; the greater the weight
given to quality, the more willing an administrator would be to increase intensity for
a given increase in profit.
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If profits would not increase under greater intensity, the model suggests the hospi-
tal would instead decrease intensity. That is, the hospital would do better by reducing
costs to provide lower intensity care under the alternative system. Responding this
way would entail opting into the less generous IPPS because the provider will not
continue to meet the LOS criterion.
We test the first of these two predictions by focusing on the LTCHs with baseline
average LOS below 25 days (the Low group) which operate throughout the study
period. The second study hypothesis is that protecting eligibility to relatively gener-
ous payment rates will drive LTCHs to increase treatment intensity, despite having
to bear the additional costs of treatment under prospective payment. Rather than
shorten patient stays, these LTCHs are expected to provide more days of care, on
average, under prospective payment.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
This analysis uses the implementation of prospective payment to LTCHs and
baseline facility average LOS as sources of variation in financial incentives facing
providers. This section describes the sources of information on LTCHs and LTCH
patients, this study’s empirical strategy, and the analysis plan.
Data for this analysis come from two main sources. The Medicare Provider Anal-
ysis and Review (MedPAR) file (2001-2003) and the Medicare claims file (2004)
contain 100% of all LTCH stays occurring between 2001 and 2004, as well as any
succeeding institutional stays occurring in the same year. These data contain pa-
tient stay records with admission and discharge dates, death date, diagnoses (up to
ten), age, and sex. Facility information is provided by Medicare’s Online Survey
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data. Facility information includes fiscal year
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information, size, control type (proprietary, not-for-profit and government run), par-
ticipation age (age-cohort of facility, determined by the first year of participation
in Medicare), and, for institutional stays following LTCH stays, facility type (acute
hospital, skilled nursing facility and inpatient rehabilitation facilities). Baseline in-
formation is based on 2001 data; 2001 data is then excluded from analysis.
The empirical strategy for this analysis is two-fold. First, the introduction of
prospective payment significantly changes the financial incentives facing all LTCHs
relative to cost-based reimbursement. LTCHs became eligible for the LTCH-PPS
between October 1, 2002 and September 30th, 2003, according to when each hospital
began its Fiscal Year 2003. For each hospital, the analysis data contain information
on patient stays before and after PPS implementation. Additionally, due to the
staggered implementation dates, the pre-PPS and post-PPS periods overlap in time
across hospitals. Patient stays are assigned to the post-PPS period if their discharge
date occurs on or after the first day that the treating LTCH became eligible for
prospective payment.
Second, LTCHs are grouped according to baseline average LOS to represent groups
facing three different financial incentives. The first group, is made up of LTCHs
with baseline Medicare average LOS below 25 days. This is called the Low LOS
group. Although LTCHs have been required to maintain facility average LOS above
25 days for many years, Medicare has calculated this average among all patients,
Medicare and non-Medicare (privately-insured, other coverage, and uninsured). With
the implementation of prospective payment, LTCHs were newly required to maintain
average LOS above 25 days among Medicare patients specifically. Several LTCHs in
2001 (baseline year) were able to qualify as LTCHs despite having Medicare averages
below 25 days. These LTCHs face a binding LOS criterion. We hypothesize that
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this group will provide longer patient stays under prospective payment in order to
protect their eligibility to the LTCH-PPS payment rates.
The second group of LTCHs are those with baseline average LOS between 25 and
32 days. This is called the Middle LOS group. These LTCHs are not directly at risk
for losing access to the LTCH payment rates, but their long-term access to LTCH-
PPS payment rates is expected to factor into decision-making. We hypothesize that
this group will provide shorter patient stays under prospective payment than under
cost-based reimbursement, but the reduction in days provided will be significantly
smaller than reductions made by LTCHs with baseline average LOS above 32 days.
The third group is made up of LTCHs with baseline averages above 32 days. This
is called the High LOS group. This group faces the least pressure from the LOS
criterion, and therefore, is hypothesized to shorten stays by more than the Middle
LOS group.
Tables 3.1 describes the distribution of facility average LOS during the baseline
year 2001. About 14% of LTCHs, or 32 LTCHs, fall into the Low LOS group. Table
3.2 shows the number of LTCHs in each of the three LTCH groups. Among the
235 LTCHs used in the analysis, the average LOS over the entire study period is
32.2 days. Accordingly, we use 32 days as a dividing point between the Middle and
High LTCH groups. As discussed below, one potential threat to identification is
regression to the mean. Dividing LTCHs at the population average creates groups
with homogenous regression to the mean effects. All LTCHs in the Low LOS group
would experience natural increases in their average LOS (towards the mean), while
all LTCHs in the Middle and High LOS groups would experience natural declines in
average LOS.
Several LTCHs were excluded from analysis. The largest group of LTCHs ex-
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cluded from analysis those not operating in each year 2001-2004. There are 56 newly
operating or closing LTCHs between 2001 and 2004. Second, 20 LTCHs were ex-
cluded because of missing or inconsistent fiscal year information. Finally, in order to
avoid using 2001 (baseline year) data in the analysis, We excluded 16 LTCHs which
became eligible for PPS before January 1, 2003. The remaining 235 LTCHs offer
154,555 patient stays during the study period.
We estimate Ordinary Least Squares regression models using patient-level data.
Patient length of stay, the dependent variable, is assumed to be a function of the fi-
nancial incentives facing LTCHs, the patient characteristics, hospital characteristics,
and time. We assign patient stays to the post-PPS period if the stay discharge occurs
on or after the treating LTCH became eligible for the LTCH-PPS. We also assign
patient stays to LTCH groups (Low, Middle, and High) according to the baseline
average LOS of each patient’s treating LTCH. Patient control factors include sex,
age, patient diagnoses. Major Diagnostic Categories are used to control for patient
diagnosis. Each diagnosis is assigned to one of 25 groups, and (non-exclusive) dummy
variables are included in each regression model. Facility-level control factors include
type of control, number of beds, and participation age cohort. Finally, we control
for the natural trend in LOS over time using fiscal month.
Table 3.3 show selected baseline statistics of the 235 LTCHs and their patients
used in the analysis. The most common MDCs are Diseases of the Circulatory System
and conditions related to Health Status and Other Contacts with Health Services.
Health Status and Other Contacts with Health Services includes rehabilitation, af-
tercare, and screening. The other MDCs shown in Table 3.3 vary in their prevalence
rates across the three LTCH groups.
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No. of LTCHs 235
Source: 2001 MedPAR 2001 POS file.
Note: Facility averages are not weighted to
reflect the number of discharges.
Table 3.2: LTCH Study Groups
Facilities Patients
HIGH Group LTCHs Baseline ALOS > 32 Days 67 44,776
MIDDLE Group LTCHs Baseline ALOS 25-32 Days 136 94,919
LOW Group LTCHs Baseline ALOS ≤ 25 Days 32 14,860
Total 235 154,555
Source: 2001-2003 MedPAR, 2004 Medicare Claims, 2001 POS file.
Table 3.3: LTCH Baseline Statistics
High Group Middle Group Low Group
Averages over Providers
Began Operation after 1993 49% 76% 63%
Began Operation 1983-1993 30% 16% 13%
Began Operation before 1983 21% 7% 25%
For-Profit 60% 59% 44%
No. of Beds 134 67 81
Number of LTCHs 67 136 33
Averages over Patients
Age of Patients 73 74 74
% Male Patients 46% 44% 43%
No. of Major Diagnostic
Categories 4.8 4.7 4.1
Circulatory System 68.3% 67.2% 61.1%
Health Status and Other
Contacts with Health Services 53.8% 49.1% 48.3%
Respiratory System 56.3% 48.2% 41.1%
Musculoskeletal and Connective
Tissue 26.9% 32.0% 33.1%
Kidney and Urinary Tract 36.1% 35.8% 27.3%
Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 23.5% 21.9% 14.5%
Source: 2001-2003 MedPAR, 2004 Medicare Claims, and 2001-2004 POS file.
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3.5 Results
This analysis suggests that the combination of prospective payment and the LOS
criterion in Medicare’s payment system for LTCHs elicits different actions among
LTCHs. LTCHs with baseline averages above 32 days, the High LOS group, respond
to the change in payment system as other hospitals have done in the past, short-
ening the stays they provide. LTCHs with baseline averages between 25 and 32,
the Middle LOS group, have a smaller policy response, appearing to protect their
eligibility to LTCH payment rates and reduce treatment costs. LTCHs with baseline
averages below 25 days, the Low LOS group, experience an increase in their average
LOS after PPS implementation, but this change cannot be statistically attributed to
prospective payment. The primary threat to identification, regression to the mean,
is discussed.
3.5.1 Descriptive Changes in Length of Stay
Table 3.4 presents a decomposition of the change in the average length of patient
stays before and after PPS implementation. The first column presents average LOS
during the baseline period (2001), which is excluded from the regression analysis.
The next two columns present the observed average LOS in each LTCH group before
and after PPS is implemented. The pre-PPS period spans years 2002 and 2003.
The post-PPS period spans 2003 and 2004 (excluding LTCHs eligible for PPS before
January 2003). The third column is the predicted average LOS in the post-PPS
period using an OLS regression model described below. This predicted post-PPS
average LOS is used to decompose the change in average LOS into a selection and
treatment effect, shown in columns 5 and 6.
Changes in the average LOS before and after PPS implementation are notable for
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each LTCH group. LTCHs in the High group experience a strong 12.1 day decline in
average stay lengths after implementation. LTCHs in the Middle group experience
a 2.0 day decline in average stay length. Meanwhile, LTCHs in the Low group
experience an increase in stay length in the post-PPS period by 0.3 day on average.
The two groups have strikingly similar averages in the post-PPS period. All of these
results are of the expected sign and relative magnitude (the decrease in average LOS
in the Middle group is smaller than that of the High group).
The decomposition of the changes in average LOS in the three LTCH groups
reveals the forces driving average LOS. There are two dimensions along which average
LOS can change from one period to the next. First, the selection effect is the change
in average LOS due to a changing patient population (or set of treated patients).
Hospitals may admit patients likely to have shorter or longer lengths of stay from one
period to the next. Second, the treatment effect is the change in average LOS due to
changes in treatment intensity provided by hospitals. Changes in treatment intensity
might include changing number of services or procedures provided to patients or
changes to the amount of labor devoted to each patient stay, as reflected, in this
case, by how many LTCH days are provided to patients.
An OLS regression model estimates the relationship between patient length of
stay, patient and facility characteristics, and calender time before prospective pay-
ment (i.e. “treatment” in the pre-PPS period). The predicted post-PPS average
LOS preserves this relationship and applies it to the post-PPS population.
The selection effect is the difference between the observed pre-period average LOS
and the predicted post-PPS average LOS. Thus, the selection effect measures how
average LOS would change if “treatment” were unchanged from the pre-PPS to post-
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Table 3.4: Decomposition of Change in Average Length of Stay
1 2 3 4 5 6
Predicted
Baseline Pre-PPS Post-PPS Post-PPS Selection Treatment
Avg. LOS Avg. LOS Avg. LOS Avg. LOS Effect Effect
High Group 51.5 43.2 31.2 32.5 -10.8 -1.3
Middle Group 28.2 28.1 26.1 28.1 0.0 -2.0
Low Group 23.9 25.8 26.1 27.6 1.8 -1.5
Source:2001-2003 MedPAR, 2004 Claims,2001-2004 POS file
Note: Averages are weighted by the number of patients.
Baseline period is 2001.
PPS period and only the population of treated patients were allowed to vary. By
contrast, calculation of the treatment effect holds constant the population of treated
patients, but allows “treatment” to vary. Here, we calculate the treatment effect as
the difference between the observed post-period average LOS and the predicted post-
period average. The selection and treatment effects are not necessarily intentional
changes in the set of treated patients or treatment intensity. Rather, these changes
are due to a mixture of intentional actions and the randomness of patient populations
and treatment needs.
As Table 3.4 indicates, LTCHs in the High group experience sizable, and com-
pounding, selection and treatment effects. These hospitals experience an 12.1 day
decline in average LOS under the new payment system. Nearly 11 days of this de-
cline can be attributed to changes in the set of patients treated; patients admitted
in the post-PPS period are likely to stay significantly fewer days than before im-
plementation. In addition, 1.3 days of this decline can be attributed to changes in
treatment. These LTCHs are able to shorten stays significantly and remain eligible
for the LTCH payment rates.
The Middle group experiences a 2.0 day decline in average LOS. This change
is due to changing “treatment”, rather than changing patient populations. These
LTCHs admit patients likely to stay as long after PPS implementation as patients
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treated in the pre-PPS period (the selection effect is zero). With baseline averages
above the LOS criterion, these hospitals have some ability to shorten stay lengths
and remain eligible for the relatively generous LTCH-PPS payment rates. Changing
treatment accounts for a 2.0 day reduction in the average LOS.
Finally, changes in LOS in the Low group are also notable. Table 3.4 shows that
average LOS increases from the baseline period (23.9 days), to the Pre-PPS period
(25.8 days), and to the Post-PPS (26.1 days). Note that already by the Pre-PPS
period, average LOS is above 25 days, the LOS criterion.1 From there, the Low
group experiences a 0.3 day increase in average LOS. This change is primarily due
to a positive selection effect. Holding “treatment” constant, the average LOS among
these LTCHs would increase by 1.8 days due to the change in the set of treated
patients. Patients treated in the post-PPS period, thus, appear to be longer-staying
patients than those treated in the pre-PPS period. With ‘average’ LOS above the 25
day LOS criterion, LTCHs have the incentive to shorten stays by changing treatment.
Changing treatment reduces the average LOS by 1.5 days.
3.5.2 Models of Length of Stay
The decomposition results are consistent with the hypothesized responses to the
change in payment system for each LTCH group. However, the decomposition de-
scribes the total changes in average LOS after implementation. In order to isolate the
policy effect of prospective payment for each LTCH group, it is necessary to control
for the impact of patient characteristics, facility characteristics and a secular trend
on length of stay. Table 3.5 presents two OLS policy model results which adjust for
these factors. The main hypothesis is that variation in financial incentives across
the LTCH groups will drive different actions under prospective payment: Low LOS
1Recall that study groups are defined during the baseline period, rather than the Pre-PPS period.
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LTCHs are expected to provide longer stays, Middle LOS LTCHs are expected to
shorten stays only slightly, while High LOS LTCHs are expected to shorten stays
significantly.
Table 3.5 presents regression results for the main policy variables. Control vari-
ables are not presented here but can be found in the appendix, Table A. Controlling
for the secular trend in stay lengths is possible because of the staggered implementa-
tion dates across LTCHs. Between January and September 2003, there are LTCHs in
both pre-PPS and post-PPS periods. As more LTCHs become eligible for prospec-
tive payment, the pre-PPS group shrinks. The time trend can be separated from
PPS eligibility, but the two are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.69
(p-value < 0.000). Except for the secular trend, output for the control variables is
not presented.
Model 1 in Table 3.5 is used to estimate the change in patient length of stay
associated with the change in payment system. Testing whether the PPS effect
differs by LTCH group (using interaction terms) allows us to test whether the Low
and Middle LTCH groups respond differently to PPS than LTCHs in the High group
(the reference group). The results from Model 1 suggest this is so. While patients
treated in LTCHs in the High group experience a 9 day decline in length of stay
on average, there are offsetting responses in the two other LTCH groups. The point
estimates suggest a much smaller day reduction in the number of LTCH days provided
among Middle group LTCHs, and an increase in the number of LTCH days provided
by Low group LTCHs. Middle group LTCHs decrease stay lengths by an average 0.21
days under prospective payment, but this effect is much smaller than the response
by LTCHs with relatively high baseline averages. LTCHs in the Low group appear to
keep patients 2 days longer on average than they did under cost-based reimbursement.
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Table 3.5: Length of Stay Models
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
PPS -9.10 2.99 ** -5.69 2.05 **
Middle Group -13.07 3.76 ** -10.71 3.02 ***
Middle Group x PPS 8.89 3.51 * 4.14 2.22 *
Low Group -16.03 4.62 ** -13.33 3.81 **
Low Group x PPS 11.15 3.91 ** 5.78 2.72 *
Fiscal Month -0.13 0.05 ** -0.44 -0.17 **
Middle Group x Fiscal Month 0.43 0.19 *
Low Group x Fiscal Month 0.49 0.25 *
Constant 40.68 5.69 *** 39.01 5.32 ***
No. Observations 154,555 154,555
R-Squared 0.03 0.03
Full PPS Full PPS
Effects 90% C.I. Effects 90% C.I.
High Group -9.10 (-4.19, -14) -5.69 (-2.33, -9.05)
Middle Group -0.21 (-1.56, 1.14) -1.55 (-0.62, -2.47)
Low Group 2.06 (-0.69, 4.8) 0.09 (-2.98, 3.16)
Source:2001-2003 MedPAR, 2004 Claims, 2001-2004 POS file
Note: Full models with control variables are presented in the appendix.
*** p-value < 0.000, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.10
That confidence intervals for these two LTCH groups each cross zero could be
interpreted as either no policy response, or that protecting LTCH status leads these
two LTCH groups to keep patients as long under prospective payment as under cost-
based reimbursement. In either case, the offsetting effects are statistically separable
from the policy response by LTCHs in the High group.
The primary threat to identification in this pre-post study design is regression
to the mean. The regression to the mean phenomenon predicts that LTCHs with
baseline averages below and above the population mean (32.2 days during the study
period) will experience subsequent averages closer to the population mean without
intentionally altering admission or treatment policies. Model 1 in Table 3.5 does not
control for this threat, and regression to the mean may be an important component
of the selection and treatment effects presented in Table 3.4.

















































































Figure 3.1: Trend in Length of Stay by LTCH Group
in the LTCH payment system in two of the three LTCH groups. Namely, both re-
gression to the mean and a protective response to prospective payment would result
in longer patient stays among LTCHs in the Low group. Likewise, both regression
to the mean and a reduction in resources devoted to patient care under PPS would
result in shorter patient stays among LTCHs in the High group. Regression to the
mean is not expected confound the PPS effect among LTCHs with baseline averages
between 25 and 32 days because they have opposite predictions. Regression to the
mean predicts longer stays (this group having facility averages below the population
mean), while the hypothesized PPS effect is a shortening of stays.
Figure 3.1 presents trends in monthly average LOS in each LTCH group before
PPS implementation, and offers a glimpse of how strong the regression to the mean
effect may be for each group. For this figure, LTCHs are assigned to each of the
three groups based on the facility average LOS in the first three months of the
77
baseline period: January 2001 through March 2001. As the figure shows, the greatest
confounding may occur with the set of LTCHs in the Low group. For this group there
is a clear upward jump in averages after the third month. A weaker downward trend
is observable among LTCHs in the High group. These trend lines are only suggestive
of each group’s regression to the mean effect, however, because other forces may be at
play during this period. In particular, Low group LTCHs may have lengthened stays
before PPS implementation in anticipation of their facility averages being assessed
under the tighter criterion. Such an action would have been in keeping with the
financial incentives of cost-based reimbursement. Nevertheless, in order for LTCHs’
identifiable responses to prospective payment to be robust, there must be a PPS
effect for each of the three groups over and above these changes in length of stay.
A way to over-correct for the regression to the mean bias is to include group-
specific time trends in LOS in the model. The time trend variable, Fiscal Month,
measures the average monthly change in discharge rates among all LTCHs throughout
the study period. Using fiscal time, rather than calendar time, centers time around
PPS eligibility. The first month of PPS eligibility, regardless of the calendar time it
occurs, has a fiscal month value of 1. Interacting this variable with the LTCH groups
captures each group’s monthly changes in length of stay. The regression to the mean
effects are included in each of these trends. The imperfection of this method is that
including these terms separates the instantaneous policy effects (now represented in
the PPS and PPS-group interaction terms) from the policy responses which play out
over time (now captured in the group-specific time trends). While providers can be
expected to make changes to treatment and admission decisions as soon as the new
payment system is in place, further adjustments can certainly be expected to take
place. Unfortunately, the group-specific time trends capture not only the regression
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to the mean effects, but also the policy responses played out over time.
The results of this model are presented in Model 2 of Table 3.5. This model shows
that the PPS effect among LTCHs in the High group is primarily an instantaneous
effect. This effect remains robust after controlling for this group-specific time trend,
and shows that LTCHs provider an average of 5.7 fewer days under prospective pay-
ment than under cost-based reimbursement. PPS-group interaction terms remain
significant at the 10% level after controlling for group-specific time trends, suggest-
ing that the instantaneous policy effect among LTCHs in the Middle and Low groups
are different from the reference group. Middle group LTCHs have a smaller policy
response than the High group LTCHs, providing 1.6 fewer days on average under
prospective payment. The instantaneous policy response in this group is differen-
tiable from a null response: the confidence interval does not cross zero, but there is
a slight overlap with that of the High group.
The policy response by LTCHs in the Low group is less robust. This group’s
instantaneous PPS effect again cannot be differentiated from a null response, or a
perfectly offsetting response. Overall, it appears that after controlling for group-
specific trends in length of stay, Low group LTCHs keep patients as long under
prospective payment as under cost-based reimbursement.
Model 2 can be viewed as offering conservative estimates of the PPS effect for
each LTCH group because it offers only the instantaneous PPS effects for each LTCH
group and over-corrects for the regression to the mean effect. With this in mind, the
‘true’ PPS effect for each group can be bound by estimates from Models 1 and 2.
The decomposition shows that High group LTCHs experienced an 12.1 day decline
in average LOS in the post-PPS period, both by changing treatment and through
selection of patients. Controlling for patient and facility characteristics, and the
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secular trends in LOS, the PPS effect appears to be a shortening of stays by providing
between 5.7 and 9 fewer days of care, on average. LTCHs in the Middle group also
experienced a decline in average LOS by changing treatment. These LTCHs exhibit
a much smaller response to PPS, as hypothesized, and reduce treatment intensity
by shortening stays by 0.2 to 1.6 days. Although Low group LTCHs experience an
increase in average LOS in the post-PPS period, their policy response is unclear as
it is not statistically separable from a null response.
3.6 Discussion
This analysis considers how the presence of the LOS criterion in Medicare’s pay-
ment system for LTCHs alters behavior under prospective payment. It appears that
maintaining eligibility is an important factor in decision making for LTCHs, and hos-
pitals relatively close to the LOS criterion respond to prospective payment differently
than hospitals relatively far above it. Given the differing responses to prospective
payment among LTCHs, appropriate monitoring of access to care and quality of
care under Medicare’s LTCH benefit requires not just the consideration of vulner-
able patient populations, but also consideration of how access and quality may be
differentially affected across LTCHs.
High group LTCHs exhibit a strong response to prospective payment. This group
shortens stays by 5.7 to 9.1 days on average. This reduction is robust to the re-
gression to the mean effect and other natural changes in length of stay over time.
This response is also much stronger than the response by short-term hospitals when
the Inpatient PPS was introduced in the early 1980s. These hospitals shortened
stays by about one day under prospective payment, after experiencing a very weak
downward trend (average LOS 13.8 in 1968 and 10.1 in 1982) [37]. As shown in the
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decomposition (Table 3.4), most of the decline in average LOS among these hospi-
tals is due to changing patient populations; that is, these LTCHs select significantly
shorter-staying patients after PPS was introduced than before.
Although it is not possible to determine how much of this change is intentional
and how much of it is caused by the natural randomness in patients’ needs over time,
the significant selection effect is a signal that access to LTCH services may be at risk
under prospective payment. Patients who require exceptionally long stays may lose
access to LTCH care under PPS. If the LTCH was the most appropriate treatment
setting for these patients under cost-based reimbursement, then health outcomes are
likely to suffer when this population is treated elsewhere.
LTCHs in the Middle group exhibit a smaller policy response to prospective pay-
ment, as hypothesized. These LTCHs appear to protect their LTCH status by short-
ening stays by between 0.2 and 1.6 days after PPS implementation. Though smaller
that response by High group LTCHs, the magnitude of the Middle group’s response
could be considered large compared to previous experience with PPS in hospitals.
The decomposition shows that the change in average LOS after PPS implementation
was due to changing treatment intensity. While providing fewer services is certainly
the intent of prospective payment, it is too soon to tell if these changes are desirable.
Patient outcomes, like mortality and health status at discharge, must be monitored
to determine whether this reduction in treatment intensity has improved the value
of LTCH care, or whether quality has suffered.
The PPS effect among LTCHs in the Low group is not statistically robust to
regression to the mean effect and other natural changes in LOS. It may be the case
that this LTCH group had low baseline averages simply due to the randomness in
patient populations from year to year. If this is the case, then we can expect this
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set of LTCHs to behave under PPS comparably with LTCHs in the Middle group.
For this group, special attention should be given to patient outcomes and quality of
care.
Finally, the question of whether 25 days is an appropriate LOS criterion remains.
When the LOS criterion is set too low, the Medicare program may inappropriately
encourage LTCH stays when patients could be treated in far less costly settings
with no detriment in the quality of care provided. When set too high, however,
the program discourages providing appropriately long stays if they are not ‘long
enough’ from the program’s perspective. This analysis suggests that the 25-day
LOS criterion is probably not too strict (i.e. not too high). If set higher, Middle
group LTCHs could be expected to admit longer-staying patients (as Low group
LTCH did), and a weaker downward selection effect could be expected among LTCHs
in the HIGH Group (because long staying patients would not be as unattractive).
Moreover, as LTCHs grow in number, the forces of prospective payment and greater
competition among LTCHs will likely drive increases in admissions among relatively
low-severity patients. Raising the LOS criterion may be an appropriate refinement to
the Medicare LTCH benefit to keep LTCH financial interests aligned with program
interests.
CHAPTER IV
Comparing Value in Post-Acute Care: Do Medicare
Payments Reflect Quality
4.1 Introduction
Medicare beneficiaries often face multiple options for care following an inpatient
stay, including care provided in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), inpatient rehabili-
tation facilities (IRFs), long-term care hospitals (LTCHs), as well as the home care
option. It is often not clear which option is better. Many factors have been shown
to influence provider choice. Post-acute care providers appear to treat similar sets of
patients and therefore may provide similar services. Recent work has found that ex-
tensive substitution of care across PAC settings occurs among Medicare beneficiaries
[13].
Substitution of care is an important issue for the Medicare program. Medicare
currently maintains distinct prospective payment systems for SNFs, IRFs, LTCHs
and home health agencies. These systems vary widely in their design parameters,
patient eligibility, coverage, and terms of provider participation. Payment rate gen-
erosity also varies across post-acute care payment systems. Although each payment
system may be internally consistent—i.e., appropriately set payment rates to the av-
erage treatment costs of patients in each classification category—payment rates may
not be externally consistent, i.e., consistent from one type of provider to another. By
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maintaining parallel payment systems for post-acute care, in principle the Medicare
program may pay providers very differently for providing very similar care to very
similar patients. Hence, it is of interest to uncover evidence as to whether this occurs
in practice.
Appropriate payment for services across PAC types is particularly salient for
LTCHs. Long-Term Care Hospitals are designed to provide extensive medical and
rehabilitative care to chronic, critically ill patients. Chapter 2 of this dissertation
found evidence that despite LTCHs’ apparent narrow treatment focus, substitution
between LTCHs and other PAC providers occurs. In markets with LTCHs in opera-
tion, fewer Medicare beneficiaries use hospital-based SNFs and IRFs. LTCHs by far
are the most expensive PAC setting under the Medicare program, and can earn as
much as 12 times as much as SNFs and IRFs for treating comparable patients [27].
Externally inconsistent payment for medical care is not necessarily inefficient,
nor is it necessarily undesirable. To the extent that some providers are paid more
than other providers for treating a similar set of patients, and are able to achieve
commensurately better health and cost outcomes among patients, the difference in
payments may be neither inefficient nor undesirable. But, with respect to PAC, how
health and cost outcomes vary among clinically similar patients across settings has
not received sufficient attention and is not well understood.
The objective of this chapter is to measure differences in health and cost out-
comes in one set of patients treated in SNFs, IRFs and LTCHs. This chapter fo-
cuses specifically on patients who receive prolonged mechanical ventilation in acute
hospitals and are discharged to SNFs, IRFs and LTCHs for post-acute treatment.
Comparing health and cost outcomes among these patients provides a test of how
well these post-acute modalities substitute for one another. The results of this study
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Table 4.1: Average Payment to PAC providers for Mechanically Ventilated Patients
Respiratory Failure Present Respiratory Failure Absent
PAC Setting Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
SNF $7,555 $7,528 $6,826 $6,795
LTCH $52,860 $36,604 $37,666 $28,718
IRF $16,593 $11,016 $16,310 $10,466
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claim files, 2004 POS file
shed light on how interchangeable care provided by SNFs, LTCHs, and IRFs is for
patients who are or have received prolonged mechanical ventilation.
Patients who receive prolonged mechanical ventilation comprise an appropriate
group with which to study substitutability in post-acute care. Treating long-term
ventilator dependent patients is an area of specialization among LTCHs. Since they
comprise a relatively small group of providers and only about 1% of all Medicare-
covered hospital stays are followed by an LTCH stay, it is important to study a
sizeable population within LTCHs. An estimated 10.7% of Medicare-covered hospital
stays are followed by an LTCH stay among patients receiving prolonged mechanical
ventilation in acute hospitals,1 and these patients make up about 15.2% of all LTCH
patients. Providing post-acute care to prolonged mechanically ventilated patients
is fairly common in all three settings. In 2004, there were 15,259 cases in LTCHs,
5,028 cases in IRFs, and an estimated 25,500 cases in SNFs. LTCHs are also paid
substantially more to provide post-acute care to patients who received prolonged
mechanical ventilation in the acute setting than are SNFs and IRFs. See Table 4.1
for average Medicare payments in 2004 to LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs.
This study contributes to three strains of research. First, there is an extensive
literature to build upon regarding substitutability of care across PAC setting. Rather
than focus on the extent that different PAC providers are used in place of each
1Based on a 10% sample of Medicare beneficiaries with at least one hospital stay in 2004.
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other, the focus here is on how well LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs actually substitute
for one another. That is, many studies of post-acute site-of-care substitution focus
on the relationship between patients’ characteristics and where they are placed; in
this study, we instrument for where patients are placed, and consider the outcomes
of care provided by SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs. Second, the literature on LTCHs
and their role in health care markets is small but growing. This study adds to
this literature by measuring the clinical benefits to LTCH care. Third, studies of
treatment and outcomes of prolonged mechanically ventilated patients are typically
limited to the medical literature. Economic studies are often from the perspective of
hospital finances. But, a growing frequency of these cases and their expense make
them a policy-relevant group for the Medicare program. This study adds to our
understanding of the economic burden, from the Medicare program’s perspective, of
prolonged mechanical ventilation.
This study uses an instrumental variables approach to compare health and cost
outcomes of SNF, LTCH and IRF treatment for long-term ventilator dependent
patients. The two instruments for choice of PAC setting are: differential distance to
the nearest LTCH and IRF, and the number of LTCHs and IRFs located within 100
miles of patients’ home zip code. These instruments are predictive of patients’ use
of PAC.
Study patients—i.e. patients who have received prolonged mechanical ventilation
and received post-acute care after their acute-care hospital stay—are identified in
the acute hospital setting with DRG values equal to 475 (Respiratory Diagnosis
with 96+ Ventilator Support) or 483 (Tracheostomy with 96+ hours of ventilator
support, for diagnoses other than face, mouth and neck). Patients’ acute hospital
stays are matched with their post-acute stays in SNFs, LTCHs or IRFs. (These PAC
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provider stays follow directly.) Patients are divided into two groups: patients with
and without respiratory failure present during the PAC stay. If the diagnosis ICD-9
codes 518.81-518.84 are present in the PAC claim record, we assign the patient to
the respiratory failure group.2
This study compares rates of mortality, medical complications, readmission to
acute hospitals, and 6-month follow up Medicare expenditure among treatment
groups. We find that LTCHs achieve lower mortality rates among patients with-
out respiratory failure than comparable SNF patients, and have higher mortality
rates among patients with respiratory failure. For both sets of patients, rates of
many complications are higher among LTCH patients than SNF patients. However,
across the board, LTCHs achieve lower rates of readmission to acute hospitals. Re-
sults for IRF patients are mixed. In some cases, IRFs out perform SNFs, but for the
most part the results are inconclusive as to how IRF care compares to SNF care.
This analysis proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the literature on
prolonged mechanical ventilation and use of PAC, as well as the extent of substitu-
tion across PAC settings. Section 4.3 explains the research methods and estimation
strategy used in this analysis. This section includes tests of the validity of differential
distance as an instrument for choice of PAC setting. Section 4.4 presents the results.
Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of the results.
4.2 Literature Review
The push towards using cost-effective alternative settings to the acute hospital has
probably no better case study than among patients requiring prolonged mechanical
2Note that patients included in this study do not necessarily receive mechanical ventilation in the post-
acute care setting. All these patients receive mechanical ventilation in the acute setting, but there is great
variance across PAC setting. About two-thirds of the study group, who use LTCHs are ventilated, but very
few SNF and IRF patients are. We found that just 0.4% of SNF patients and about 1% of IRF patients in
this group appear to be ventilated during the PAC stay. These patients appear to have been weaned from
the ventilator in the acute care setting.
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ventilation. ICU utilization has increased over the last several years, especially among
Medicare beneficiaries, and utilization is expected to continue increasing. Care for
patients requiring mechanical ventilation has been an important part of managing
scarce ICU resources. Mechanically ventilated patients have been shown to dis-
proportionately consume resources within ICUs, and it appears that long-staying,
difficult to wean patients drive the disproportionate resource use: patients with at
least 96 hours of ventilation comprise 39% of all patients undergoing mechanical ven-
tilation, but account for 64% of annual inpatient costs [45]. Moreover, the need for
cost effective alternatives to the ICU for mechanically ventilated and other chronic,
critically ill patients has been attributed to the expansion of treatment focus of early-
operating LTCHs to include care for these patients, new construction of LTCHs, as
well as growth in hospital-based SNFs (subacute units) and similar freestanding SNFs
[16]. Now, prolonged mechanical ventilation is recognized as a critical care modality
that goes beyond the ICU setting to include other settings including step-down units,
respiratory care units, and LTCHs [40].
In this section, a brief background on treatment for mechanical ventilation is pre-
sented and findings from studies of weaning and mortality outcomes of mechanically
ventilated patients are summarized. No studies on mortality and weaning outcomes
of patients treated in SNFs were located, so the studies discussed here cover LTCHs,
respiratory care units, and IRFs. There were no studies found that directly compared
patient outcomes across types of PAC settings for mechanically ventilated patients.
Although not directly addressed in research, there is potential for appropriate sub-
stitution among PAC providers in the treatment of mechanically ventilated patients.
First, the general similarity of patient outcomes across LTCHs, IRFs, and respiratory
care units, at least superficially, suggests substitution is possible among patients with
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prolonged mechanical ventilation. Second, there is an extensive literature measuring
the extent of substitution among PAC providers for other patient populations. This
literature is useful in that it finds evidence that site of care substitution is extensive
among patients with common conditions. Substitution may also be extensive among
patients with less common conditions.
There are several different causes of ventilator dependence among patients. Me-
chanical ventilation is necessary when the respiratory system fails; that is, failure of
the ventilatory and/or gas exchange capabilities. Use of ventilator support may be
very brief, or it may go beyond 24 hours. Treatment for individuals requiring venti-
lation for more than 24 hours is focused on not only ventilator management, but also
addressing the underlying causes of ventilator dependence [24]. The ability to wean
from the ventilator depends on respiratory muscle strength, the load applied to those
muscles, and the respiratory drive to breathe [11]. In general, the sooner a patient
can be weaned from a ventilator, the better. Unnecessary delays in discontinuation
can result in ventilator-related complications. On the other hand, premature extu-
bation carries its own risks. Patients who must be re-intubated have a higher risk
of death (6 to 12 times higher), and a higher risk of nosocomial pneumonia (8 times
higher). Indeed, treatment guidelines for weaning emphasize the need to balance
these risks [24].
While there is a very rich literature on mechanical ventilation, studies focusing on
care delivered outside acute hospital ICUs are fairly limited in number and scope.
A handful of studies compare mortality and weaning outcomes within LTCHs or
respiratory care units within acute hospitals. One multi-center study of LTCHs was
recently published. In contrast, just one study of mortality and weaning outcomes
in an IRF was found, and no studies of care provided in SNFs were found.
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Comparability in mortality and weaning success suggests that care may be inter-
changeable across these settings. A multi-center study of LTCHs found that 25% of
patients treated in 23 different LTCHs died in the facility [40]. This 75% survival
rate is somewhat better than what previous studies of single LTCHs found; survival
at discharge ranged from 50% to 71% in these studies [33] [5] [3] [39]. One study on
patient outcomes at an IRF found that 66% were alive at discharge [32]. Studies of
respiratory care units inside acute hospitals report discharge survival between 50%
and 94% [18] [21] [14].
Despite differences in study inclusion criteria and definitions of weaning success
across studies, weaning success is also fairly comparable. Scheinhorn et al. (2007)
found that LTCHs were able to wean 54% of patients. Other studies of single LTCHs
found that between 38% and 56% of patients were successfully weaned [33] [5] [3]
[39]. The IRF successfully weaned 50% of patients [32]. And, respiratory care units
weaned between 34% and 60% of patients [18] [21] [14].
The current study builds on previous work considering patient outcomes in two
ways. First, the current study is large, using administrative data for a large sample of
patients using SNF care after prolonged mechanical ventilation in an acute hospital,
and the universe of such patients who use LTCHs and IRFs for PAC. Second, the
current study considers how patient outcomes compare across PAC types. Up to this
point, only limited comparison of outcomes across settings has occurred. The main
trade-off in this study is that weaning success is not measured in administrative data.
Instead, we focus on mortality, PAC complications that make weaning more difficult,
PAC complications related to long-term ventilation, length of stay, readmission to
acute hospitals (for any reason, and for surgery), and 6-month follow up costs.
In addition to mortality, this study considers differences in PAC complication rates
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that either impede the weaning process, or are common side-effects of long-term ven-
tilation. Several conditions have been documented with these effects. Urinary Tract
Infections (UTI) and clostridium difficile colitis have been found to delay the onset
of the weaning process in LTCHs [40]. Renal failure has also been shown to compli-
cate the weaning process; patients receiving hemodialysis have lower weaning success
rates [4] [41]. Differences in these complication rates across setting are indicative of
how well providers are able to avoid complications to the weaning process.
Complications of long-term ventilation are also well documented. Ventilator-
acquired pneumonia is a common ventilator-related complication, occurring, in a
large international study of 360 ICUs, among 15% of patients ventilated for more
than 48 hours. Patients with ventilator-associated pneumonia experience longer pe-
riods of ventilation, but risk of death was not found to be higher among those with
pneumonia [42]. Gastrointestinal complications are also related to both the under-
lying disease process and therapeutic interventions. Mortality is quite high among
patients who develop gastrointestinal complications, including GI hemorrhage (which
we measure) and being mechanically ventilated for more than 24 hours is one predic-
tive factor of this kind of complication [25]. Finally, deep vein thrombosis has been
found to be a fairly common complication among mechanically ventilated patients.
One study that 23% of ICU patients who were ventilated for more than 7 days;
patients with deep vein thrombosis have a higher risk of pulmonary embolism than
those without. In this study, mortality was not found to be higher [17]. By compar-
ing the rates of these types of PAC complications, we measure providers’ ability to
prevent avoidable types of infections and complications.
In the more general literature on post-acute care, measurement of site of care
substitution has typically focused on the extent of substitution, and less so on the
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appropriateness of substitution. Measuring substitutability in the health industry
is notoriously difficult because of the nature of health as a commodity. The unit of
care, or the product, is difficult to define; the inputs to care may not be comparable
between services or across settings; and the outcomes of care are difficult to mea-
sure. Many studies on the substitutability of care across post-acute care setting get
around these difficulties by instead comparing clinically similar patients’ placement
in particular post-acute settings. Rather than measure directly the inputs to care,
this patient-placement approach posits that if care among post-acute settings is in-
terchangeable then we should observe clinically similar patients using services across
settings with comparable likelihood.
There are issues with this approach. Comparing the likelihood of placement in
particular settings among comparable patients measures the extent to which care de-
livered in post-acute settings are being substituted or are used in place of each other,
but does not measure how well one type of care substitutes for another. The patient
placement approach implicitly assumes that patients are placed appropriately and
does not account for differences in the quality of care. Indeed, very few studies con-
sider differences in the quality and health outcomes of care delivered across settings.
Studies of this nature in health services research are somewhat uncommon: ran-
domized controlled studies are exceedingly expensive and have ethical issues, while
non-experimental design requires a good method of controlling for unobserved fac-
tors related to health outcomes and choice of provider. Lack of patient function and
health status data that is comparable across PAC setting has also made comparison
of health outcomes particularly difficult in post-acute care.
Measuring the extent that modalities of post-acute care are being substituted for
one another is important to policy. The extent of substitution appears to vary over
92
time. Several studies in the early 1990s found that the characteristics of patients
differed significantly across post-acute settings. This differentiation suggests that
different types of patients seek care from each post-acute modality. More recent
findings, however, suggest that SNFs, IRFs, and LTCHs treat similar populations.
For example, Gage (1999) used a propensity score technique to test whether the
probability of using types of post-acute care varied with patients’ inpatient hospi-
tal diagnosis after controlling for other health-related factors (e.g. prior disability,
hospital readmission, death in current year). This study found that among patients
with stroke, respiratory infection, or inflammation, the likelihood of being placed in
a SNF, IRF or of receiving home health care differed significantly, suggesting that
there is less potential for site of care substitution. But, among patients with one
of many other medical conditions commonly requiring post-acute care after a hospi-
tal stay (including pneumonia, heart failure and shock, joint/limb reattachment and
hip/femur procedures), the likelihood of being placed in various post-acute settings
were quite comparable after controlling for disease severity-related factors. Thus,
in many cases, the particular health needs of patients do not appear to influence
the decision of which type of post-acute modality to use, thereby leaving open the
possibility for site of care substitution.
Other studies support Gage’s finding of comparable use of different types of post-
acute care among clinically similar patients. In a study decomposing the differ-
ences in treatment costs between hospital-based and freestanding SNFs, the authors
found that higher costs in hospital-based SNFs were primarily due to treatment set-
ting characteristics, rather than selection of patients with disproportionately acute
health needs [34]. That is, this study suggests that freestanding and hospital-based
SNFs treat on-the-whole comparable populations and that care is costlier on average
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at hospital-based SNF because of differences setting characteristics (such as higher
overhead costs, wage rates, number of beds, chain affiliation, and so on) and not
due to differences in patient acuity. Another study of the late 1990s used hospital-
based SNFs closures to identify those providers’ substitutes. The authors found that
among comparable hospitals (likely to have a hospital-based SNF closure), hospitals
with a closure between 1997 and 2002 experienced increases in their discharge rates
to freestanding SNFs, IRFs and LTCHs (IRFs and LTCHs were pooled). Patients in
these hospitals were 2.4% more likely to be discharged to a freestanding SNF, and
2.3% more likely to be discharged to an IRF or LTCH than patients at comparable
hospitals not experiencing a closure. This study did not find an association between
SNF closure and patient health outcomes at the hospital level [44].
Generally speaking, the studies on post-acute care substitution, patient and non-
patient factors related to post-acute care utilization, and geographic variation in
use suggest that SNFs, IRFs and LTCHs treat generally comparable populations.
The overlap in patient populations suggests that, for better or worse, services across
these modalities are being interchanged. These findings suggest that Medicare pro-
gram costs could be better managed if patients were redirected to the least costly
appropriate post-acute care setting. However, the effect on patient outcomes by
such management has not been extensively explored by the current literature. The
current study adds to the substitution literature by estimating differences in patient
outcomes across settings for a set of conditions where treatment is relatively sta-




This analysis uses an instrumental variables approach to compare patient out-
comes among skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and
inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) for mechanically ventilated patients. The
purpose of comparing patient outcomes of these post-acute care (PAC) providers is
to test whether care delivered by SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs is interchangeable, pro-
ducing similar patient health and cost outcomes.
The primary difficulty in comparing patient outcomes in any observational study is
that patients are not randomly assigned to particular providers or treatments. There
is a natural endogeneity of provider choice with respect to patient outcomes. The
concern in this study is that simply relating patients’ observed choice of PAC type
(SNF, LTCH or IRF) to their health outcomes would assume that choice of provider is
not related to patients’ characteristics and health needs (which are, in turn, related
to health outcomes). To the contrary, patients should be expected to choose a
particular setting specifically because they are likely to benefit from that mode of
care. This study uses two instruments for choice of PAC type: differential distance
to PAC providers and the number of PAC providers (of each type) within 100 miles
of patients’ home zip code of residence. These variables were chosen as instruments
because these are observable factors that are likely to influence treatment decisions,
i.e. choice of PAC type, but it is unlikely to directly affect patient outcomes. Use of
differential distance as an instrument is intended to mimic randomization of patients
into treatment and control groups [19].
This section presents evidence suggesting that differential distance is, indeed, a
valid instrument for choice of PAC type. In addition, I describe the sources of data
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used in this analysis and the estimation strategy.
4.3.1 Data Sources
The analysis relies on Medicare claims data from 2004 for a sample of benefi-
ciaries using SNFs, LTCHs or IRFs following an acute hospital stay. Patient and
institutional stay information comes from the 2004 Medicare Denominator file and
Inpatient and SNF Standard Analytic Claim files. Information about health care
providers is collected from Medicare’s 2004 Provider of Service file. Distances be-
tween zip codes centers (definitions as of April 20053) are calculated with the Great
Circle Distance Formula.4
Patient and institutional stay information are used to construct variables of pa-
tient characteristics, disease severity measures, and patient health and cost outcomes.
Patients are identified as being mechanically ventilated if they fall into DRG 475 or
483 during their acute hospital stay, and are then followed into their PAC stay (di-
rectly following the acute hospital stay). Acute hospital claims for a 10% sample of
Medicare beneficiaries with acute hospital stays in 2004 are aggregated to the stay
level and matched to SNF follow-up care. Acute hospital claims are likewise aggre-
gated and matched to LTCH and IRF follow-up care for the universe of LTCH users
and IRF users. Observations for LTCH and IRF users are weighted to reflect this
over-sampling.
Acute hospital stays with either no follow-up care, or care provided by other types
of facilities are excluded from analysis. In addition, patients living in rural areas
(areas not part of a metropolitan statistical area) are excluded from the analysis.




Table 4.2: Characteristics of LTCH, SNF and IRF Patients
SNF Users LTCH Users IRF Users
N 2,026 12,383 3,875
Patient Characteristics
Age (Mean, Std. Dev.) 74 (11) 71 (3) 70 (2)
Patient Sex: Male 47% 49% 49%
Race: White 78% 75% 83%
Race: Black 17% 20% 13%
Race: Hispanic 2% 3% 2%
Race: Other 3% 3% 2%
Current Medicare Eligibility
Old Age & Survivors 85% 80% 79%
Disability 14% 18% 19%
ESRD 1% 2% 2%
Original Medicare Eligibility
Old Age & Survivors 69% 67% 68%
Disability 30% 31% 29%
ESRD 1% 2% 2%
Discharging Hospital Characteristics
Hospital has LTC Unit 30% 31% 29%
Hospital has Rehab Unit 39% 49% 55%
Hospital has Swing Bed Designation 2% 1% 1%
Hospital has SNF Unit 32% 29% 24%
Hospital: # Beds
Mean (Std. Dev) 435 (293) 489 (82) 495 (54)
Hospital: # Residents (FTE)
Mean (Std. Dev) 61 (141) 63 (37) 79 (27)
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
tients, stratified by their choice of PAC type (SNF, LTCH and IRF). SNF users tend
to be older than LTCH and IRF users and more slightly more likely to be female.
SNF users have shorter acute hospital stays, but have higher Charlson Comorbid-
ity Index scores. The Charlson Comorbidity Index ranks patients according to the
number and seriousness of co-morbid conditions, and is predictive of risk of death
and treatment costs (not specific to post-acute care) [36]. Higher prevalent Conges-
tive Heart Failure, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Diabetes (without
complication) contribute to the higher average Charlson score among SNF users.
SNF, LTCH and IRF users also have different rates of co-morbid conditions sig-
nificant for ventilator dependent patients. Comorbidity is defined by presence in
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of LTCH, SNF and IRF Patients, Cont’d
SNF Users LTCH Users IRF Users
N 2,026 12,383 3,875
Hospital Stay Information
Acute Length of Stay
Mean (Std. Dev) 22 (25) 27 (5) 26 (4)
Charlson Cormorbidity
Index: Mean (Std. Dev) 2 (1.6) 2 (0.4) 2 (0.3)
Admitting Diagnosis: MDC
1 Dis of Nervous System 5.9% 10.1% 9.8%
4 Dis of the Respiratory System 70.1% 47.7% 59.7%
5 Dis of the Circulatory System 8.7% 17.3% 12.3%
6 Dis of the Digestive System 2.9% 7.5% 4.5%
7 Dis of the Hepatobilary Sys & Pancreas 0.3% 0.9% 0.6%
8 Dis of the Musculoskeletal & Conn Tissue 1.0% 2.9% 2.9%
9 Dis of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tiss & Breast 0.3% 0.7% 0.3%
18 Infectious & Parasitic Dis 4.0% 3.7% 2.3%
Acute Hospital Comorbidities
Cardiac Arrest 2.9% 5% 4.0%
C. Difficile Colitis 4.1% 5% 3.5%
Stroke/Intercrannial Hemorrhage 5.0% 9% 8.1%
Deep Vein Thrombosis 4.0% 5% 4.9%
Ileus Gastoparesis 0.1% 0% 0.1%
GI Hemorrhage 5.5% 6% 5.3%
Hypotension 4.2% 6% 6.8%
Acute Pulmonary Embolism 1.2% 2% 2.2%
Pleural Effusion 6.8% 10% 9.4%
Pneumothorax 2.1% 4% 4.4%
Pneumonia 52.8% 49% 50.3%
Renal Failure 19.3% 26% 21.0%
Sepsis 6.3% 7% 6.5%
Urinary Tract Infection 21.2% 18% 13.3%
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
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the acute hospital stay (in one of the ten diagnosis fields for each inpatient claim;
stay records may consist of multiple claims). Mechanically ventilated SNF patients
have higher rates of Pneumonia (53%) and Urinary Tract Infections (21%). LTCH
patients experience higher rates of renal failure and insufficiency (26%) and pleural
effusion (10%). IRF patients experience comorbidity rates in line with SNF and
LTCH patients.
Admitting diagnoses were categorized into the 25 Major Diagnostic Categories
(MDC). Not surprisingly for mechanically ventilated patients, admitting diagnoses
most commonly fell into Diseases of the Respiratory System (70%, 48% and 60%
for SNF, LTCH and IRF users, respectively). Admitting diagnoses also commonly
fell into Diseases of the Circulatory system, Nervous System, Digestive System, and
Infectious & Parasitic Diseases.
4.3.2 Instrumentation for choice of PAC setting
Differential distance appears to be a good instrument for provider choice. It is
predictive of provider choice, but it is unlikely to have an independent effect on
health and cost outcomes. Evidence presented in this section suggests that patients
are more or less randomly located near or far from SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs with
respect to their characteristics and measures of disease severity. As the argument
goes, if observable characteristics appear balanced across study groups, unobservable
factors (which cannot be directly controlled for) are also likely to be balanced across
the study groups.
Table 4.4 shows that choice of PAC type is correlated with differential distance
among non-rural mechanically ventilated patients and non-rural PAC providers. Dif-
ferential distances measures how much farther than the closest PAC provider a pa-
tient must travel in order to choose a particular type of PAC provider. The farther
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Table 4.4: First-Stage Regression Models
Respiratory Failure Absent
Dependent Variables
Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept 0.46 0.06 *** 0.22 0.02 ***
Log DD to LTCH -0.05 0.01 *** 0.01 0.00 **
Log DD to IRF 0.02 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 *
No. SNFs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
No. LTCHs/100 miles 0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***





Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept 0.88 0.10 *** 0.07 0.01 ***
Log DD to LTCH -0.08 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Log DD to IRF 0.03 0.01 ** -0.01 0.00 ***
No. SNFs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
No. LTCHs/100 miles 0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00




Source: 2004 Denominator File, Claims files, 2004 POS file.
Note: *** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value< 0.05
patients must travel in order to choose a SNF, LTCH or IRF, the less likely patients
are to choose any provider of that type. For example, 68% of patients whose closest
PAC provider is a SNF (meaning the differential distance to a SNF is zero) choose
to use a SNF for care following their acute hospital stay. Among patients whose
closest PAC provider is not a SNF (for whom differential distance is greater than
zero), the proportion of SNF users drops off to 56%. As the proportion choosing
SNFs falls, the proportion of mechanically ventilated patients who choose LTCHs
and IRFs increases. This relationship is also apparent with respect to differential
distance to LTCHs. It is weaker for IRFs.
100
Rural patients and providers are excluded from the analysis; they are defined
as those patients and providers located in a zip code not part of a metropolitan
statistical area. Patients are excluded because they tend to have different health
characteristics than urban patients and reside further from all types of providers.
SNFs are the most common type of PAC provider, with about 15,000 operating in
2004, compared to 353 LTCHs and about 1500 IRFs. Only about 1% of mechanically
ventilated patients reside nearest to a PAC provider other than a SNF (the 99th
%ile is 2.4 miles). The median differential distance to LTCHs is 6.7 miles. The
median differential distance to IRFs is 3.0 miles. In most cases, if the differential
distance to SNFs is zero, patients must travel farther in order to choose a LTCH
or IRF (and the differential distance is positive). There is not complete trade-off
between differential distances between SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs, however. Because
the distance calculation uses the center of the zip code, rather than patients’ and
providers’ addresses, differential distance is the same across PAC types where the
nearest of multiple types are located in the same zip code. SNFs serve as the reference
group for the analysis.
The second criterion that an instrument must meet to be valid is to be distributed
more or less randomly with respect to the unobserved characteristics influencing
treatment outcome. Differential distance would not be a good instrument for choice
of PAC type if it were associated with patient characteristics predictive of the health
and cost outcomes of interest. If this were the case, differential distance would
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Table 4.5: Instrument Validation
Differential Differential
Distance to LTCH Distance to IRF
Patient Characteristics ≤ 16 Miles > 16 Miles ≤ 5 Miles > 5 Miles
Age (Mean, (SD)) 72.91, (4.4) 72.94, (5) 73.02, (4.6) 72.73, (4.4) **
Patient Sex: Male 48% 47% * 48% 47% *
Race: White 72% 88% ** 73% 86% **
Race: Black 22% 8% ** 21% 10% **
Race: Hispanic 3% 2% ** 3% 1% **
Race: Other 3% 2% ** 3% 2% **
Current MCR Ent.: OASI 83% 85% ** 83% 84% **
Current MCR Ent.: DI 15% 14% ** 15% 15%
Current MCR Ent.: ESRD 2% 1% ** 1% 1% **
Discharging Hospital Characteristics
Has LTC Unit 32% 27% ** 34% 23% **
Has Rehab Unit 44% 39% ** 50% 27% **
Has Swing Bed 1% 2% ** 1% 2% **
Has SNF Unit 30% 32% ** 33% 27% **
No. Beds (Mean, (SD)) 73, (58) 40, (52) ** 74, (62) 40, (45) **
No. Residents (Mean, (SD)) 483, (121) 388, (121) ** 478, (120) 401, (123) **
Hospital Stay Information
LOS (Mean, (SD)) 23.24, (9.2) 24.37, (9.9) ** 24.14, (10) 22.47, (7.8) **
Charlson Score (Mean, (SD)) 1.99, (0.6) 2.05, (0.8) ** 2, (0.6) 2.03, (0.7) **
Nervous System 8% 6% ** 7% 7% **
Respiratory System 63% 65% ** 62% 66% **
Digestive System 5% 4% ** 5% 4% **
Hepatobiliary Sys & Pancreas 1% 0% ** 1% 0% **
Musc. Sys & Conn. Tiss 2% 2% 2% 1% *
Skin, Subcut. Tissue & Brst 1% 0% ** 1% 0% **
Infectious & Parasitic Dis 4% 4% * 5% 2% **
Acute Hospital Comorbidities
Cardiac Arrest 3% 4% 4% 3% **
C. Difficile Colitis 4% 4% ** 5% 3% **
Stroke/Intrcrnl. Hemorrhage 7% 5% ** 7% 5% **
Deep Vein Thrombosis 5% 4% ** 5% 4% **
GI Hemorrhage 6% 5% ** 6% 5% **
Hypotension 5% 5% ** 5% 4% **
Acute Pulmonary Embolism 1% 1% 1% 1%
Pleural Effusion 8% 8% 8% 8% *
Pneumothorax 3% 3% ** 3% 3% **
Pneumonia 51% 52% 51% 53% **
Renal Failure 22% 20% ** 21% 21%
Sepsis 7% 6% ** 7% 6% **
Urinary Tract Infection 21% 18% ** 21% 18% **
Source: 2004 Denom. & Claims files, 2004 POS file. Differences sig. at the ** 1% and * 5% level.
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Table 4.6: Instrument Validation, Continued
No. of SNFs No. of LTCHs
w/in 100 Miles w/in 100 Miles
Patient Characteristics ≤ 240 > 240 ≤ 20 > 20
Age (Mean, (SD)) 72, (4) 74, (5) ** 72, (5) 74, (4) **
Patient Sex: Male 47% 49% ** 47% 49% **
Race: White 78% 76% ** 78% 77% **
Race: Black 18% 17% * 15% 20% **
Race: Hispanic 2% 3% ** 3% 2% **
Race: Other 2% 4% ** 4% 2% **
Current MCR Ent.: OASI 82% 86% ** 82% 85% **
Current MCR Ent.: DI 16% 13% ** 16% 13% **
Current MCR Ent.: ESRD 2% 1% ** 1% 1%
Discharging Hospital Characteristics
Has LTC Unit 34% 26% ** 33% 27% **
Has Rehab Unit 47% 37% ** 41% 44% **
Has Swing Bed 1% 1% ** 2% 1% **
Has SNF Unit 30% 32% ** 33% 29% **
No. Beds (Mean, (SD)) 45, (44) 84, (74) ** 40, (46) 86, (66) **
No. Residents (Mean, (SD)) 462, (125) 442, (117) ** 443, (127) 463, (117) **
Hospital Stay Information
LOS (Mean, (SD)) 22.8, (7.1) 24.6, (12.5) ** 23.4, (8.2) 23.6, (10.6)
Charlson Score (Mean, (SD)) 2.02, (0.6) 2, (0.7) 1.99, (0.7) 2.02, (0.7)
Nervous System 7% 7% 7% 7% **
Respiratory System 63% 63% 64% 63% *
Digestive System 4% 4% 4% 4% **
Hepatobilary Sys & Pancreas 1% 0% * 0% 0%
Musc. Sys & Conn. Tiss 2% 2% 2% 2% **
Skin, Subcut. Tissue & Brst 0% 1% 0% 0%
Infectious & Parasitic Dis 4% 4% ** 4% 4% **
Acute Hospital Comorbidities
Cardiac Arrest 3% 4% 4% 3% **
C. Difficile Colitis 3% 5% ** 3% 6% **
Stroke/Intrcrnl. Hemorrhage 7% 6% ** 7% 6% **
Deep Vein Thrombosis 4% 5% ** 4% 5% **
GI Hemorrhage 6% 6% * 6% 6% **
Hypotension 5% 5% 5% 5%
Acute Pulmonary Embolism 2% 1% ** 2% 1% **
Pleural Effusion 8% 8% 7% 8% **
Pneumothorax 3% 2% ** 3% 2% **
Pneumonia 51% 52% ** 53% 50% **
Renal Failure 22% 20% ** 22% 20% **
Sepsis 7% 7% 7% 6% **
Urinary Tract Infection 19% 21% ** 19% 21% **
Source: 2004 Denom. & Claims files, 2004 POS file. Differences sig. at the ** 1% and * 5% level.
103
Table 4.7: Instrument Validation, Continued
Number of IRFs
w/in 100 Miles
Patient Characteristics ≤ 70 > 70
Age (Mean, (SD)) 71.91, (4.3) 74.07, (4.9) **
Patient Sex: Male 47% 49% **
Race: White 80% 74% **
Race: Black 15% 20% **
Race: Hispanic 3% 2% *
Race: Other 3% 3% **
Current MCR Ent.: OASI 82% 86% **
Current MCR Ent.: DI 17% 12% **
Current MCR Ent.: ESRD 1% 1%
Discharging Hospital Characteristics
Has LTC Unit 32% 29% **
Has Rehab Unit 42% 43% *
Has Swing Bed 2% 1% **
Has SNF Unit 32% 30% **
No. Beds, (Mean, (SD)) 42, (43) 86, (73) **
No. Residents (Mean, (SD)) 459, (126) 447, (116) **
Hospital Stay Information
LOS (Mean, (SD)) 22.8, (7.2) 24.5, (11.9) **
Charlson Score (Mean, (SD)) 2.01, (0.6) 2.01, (0.7)
Nervous System 7% 7%
Respiratory System 64% 62% **
Digestive System 4% 4%
Hepatobilary Sys & Pancreas 1% 0% **
Musc. Sys & Conn. Tiss 2% 2%
Skin, Subcut. Tissue & Brst 0% 0%
Infectious & Parasitic Dis 4% 4% **
Acute Hospital Comorbidities
Cardiac Arrest 3% 4% **
C. Difficile Colitis 3% 6% **
Stroke/Intrcrnl. Hemorrhage 6% 7% **
Deep Vein Thrombosis 4% 5% **
GI Hemorrhage 6% 5% **
Hypotension 5% 5%
Acute Pulmonary Embolism 2% 1% **
Pleural Effusion 8% 7% **
Pneumothorax 3% 2% **
Pneumonia 52% 52%
Renal Failure 22% 20% **
Sepsis 6% 7%
Urinary Tract Infection 18% 22% **
Source: 2004 Denom. & Claims files, 2004 POS file.
Differences are significant at the ** 1% and * 5% level.
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not mimic randomization into study groups. Of course, how differential distance is
distributed with respect to unobserved patient characteristics cannot be assessed.
But, information from the Medicare inpatient claims and Denominator files suggests
that, to the extent that it can be assessed, differential distance is a good instrument
for choice of PAC type.
There are no major differences in patient characteristics and acute hospital stay
information across groups above and below mean values of differential distance to
LTCHs, IRFs, and number of SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs within 100 miles (Tables 4.5,
4.6, and 4.7). Mechanically ventilated patients residing nearest to LTCHs tend to
be slightly younger, slightly more likely to be non-white, and slightly more likely to
be disabled (current Medicare entitlement category). These patients have a slightly
lower Charlson comorbidity score. Among the conditions that contribute to the
Charlson score, these patients have slightly lower prevalence rates of Acute Myocar-
dial Infarction, cancer and diabetes without complication. Patients are overall similar
in terms of admitting diagnoses and rates of comorbid conditions. Dummy variables
for the Major Diagnostic Categories are mutually exclusive. Dummy variables for
comorbid conditions significant for ventilator dependent patients are not mutually
exclusive. Patients nearest to LTCHs experience renal failure and urinary tract in-
fections at slightly higher rates than patients further away from LTCHs. Similar
patterns are present above and below mean value of differential distance to IRFs.
The greatest differences across LTCH and IRF groups are in the characteristics
of the discharging acute care hospitals. Patients nearer LTCHs tend to be treated in
hospitals offering long-term care (not necessarily a Long-Term Care Hospital), and
housing an IRF and SNF (hospital-based providers). Patients located nearer LTCHs
tend also to be treated in larger hospitals, with more total beds and more physicians.
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These differences are present even after removing rural patients. Differences in dis-
charging hospital characteristics over quartiles of distance to IRFs are similar, but
patients between the 25th and 50th %ile of differential distance (located between 0.5
and 3.0 miles from IRFs) appear to be treated in the larger hospitals.
Overall, information from the Medicare claim and Denominator files for mechani-
cally ventilated patients suggests that differential distance can be used as an instru-
ment for choice of PAC type. Differential distance is correlated with choice of PAC
type, and patients appear to be more or less randomly distributed in differential dis-
tance with respect to their observable characteristics. Of course, it cannot be verified
with absolute certainty that differential distance is not correlated with unobserved
factors influencing treatment choices, but with the information available, it appears
that differential distance can mimic randomization into study groups.
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy
This analysis will follow a typical two-stage least squares estimation strategy.
Differential distances to LTCHs and IRFs are log-transformed, and linear models are
estimated.
The first stage models are:
LTCH user = β + β1DDLTCH + β2DDIRF + β3S100 + β4L100 + β5I100 +
β6X + β4H
IRF user = β + β1DDLTCH + β2DDIRF + β3S100 + β4L100 + β5I100 +
β6X + β4H
where LTCH user and IRF user are the observed choices of PAC type. DDLTCH
and DDIRF represent the log-transformed differential distances to LTCHs and IRFs;
differential distance to SNFs is the exclude category. The variables S100, L100 and
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Acute Renal Failure Condition is absent in acute hospital stay,
Urinary Tract Infection but present during PAC stay
Acute Readmission
Admission for any reason, following directly from
PAC discharge
Acute Readmission: Surgery
Surgery DRG listed in acute hospital claim, fol-
lowing PAC discharge
6- month follow up costs
Study population limited to stays occurring in
January to June 2004; Medicare expenditure.
I100 are the number of SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs within 100 miles of beneficiary
residence, respectively. X is a matrix of patient characteristics; H is a matrix of
discharging hospital characteristics. Selected results from the first-stage model are
shown in Table 4.4; the full models are in appendix Tables B through B.
The second stage is:
Outcome = γ + γ1L̂TCH + γ2ÎRF + γ3X + γ4H
where outcomes include patient health and cost outcomes listed in Table 4.8. The
predicted values for using an LTCH and IRF, rather than the observed choice of PAC
type, are used in the second stage. The same set of patient and discharging hospital
characteristics used in the first stage are used in the second stage. Mortality measures
begin counting days at the discharge from the acute care hospital. Conditions must
be newly present in the PAC stay (rather than the acute hospital stay) in order to
be considered a PAC complication.
Next we proceed with the results.
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4.4 Results
This section presents the regression results of patients outcomes among patients
with prolonged mechanical ventilation during their acute hospital stay, followed by
PAC stays at SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs. We find divergent patterns in patient mor-
tality among SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs among patients with and without respiratory
failure present during the PAC stay. Among patients where respiratory failure is
not present during the PAC stay, LTCHs appear to produce substantially better
mortality results than SNFs and IRFs. However, among patients where respiratory
failure is present during the PAC stay, LTCH patients experience significantly higher
mortality than SNF and IRF patients. We propose that, among this higher severity
group of patients, LTCHs substitute more appropriately for acute care hospital care
than PAC, and confounds the comparison of patient outcomes among SNFs, LTCHs
and IRFs.
Tables presented in this section include tables of observed outcomes rates (mor-
tality, complications, readmission, etc) among SNF, LTCH and IRF users, as well as
uninstrumented, basic linear probability models, and the instrumented linear prob-
ability models. The uninstrumented models correct for differences in the observable
among SNF, LTCH and IRF users. Our main findings are based on the instrumented
model results, as these models use the instrumented PAC choice to help control for
unobserved differences across facilities.
Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 present observed mortality, PAC complication, and
acute hospital readmission rates, as well as 6-month follow up Medicare spending
among SNF, LTCH and IRF patients with and without respiratory failure reported
in their PAC claims. Patients with ICD-9 codes 518.81, 518.82, 518.83 or 518.84 in at
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Table 4.9: Mortality in PAC Setting, by Respiratory Failure Status
No Respiratory Respiratory Failure
Failure Present
SNF LTCH IRF SNF LTCH IRF
1 Year Mortality 47% 50% 24% 52% 63% 33%
90 Day Mortality 33% 34% 13% 36% 44% 20%
60 Day Mortality 27% 28% 10% 28% 35% 16%
30 Day Mortality 19% 17% 6% 18% 21% 11%
Sample N 1,350 3,553 2,998 676 8,830 877
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claim files,
2004 POS file
least one of up to 12 diagnosis fields from SNF, LTCH and IRF claims are assigned
to the respiratory failure group. Patients with respiratory failure are commonly
treated in each of the three settings.5 Table 4.9 shows that within each site of
care, mortality is consistently higher among patients with respiratory failure than
without. In addition, mortality is consistently highest is among patients who use
LTCHs than those who choose SNFs and IRFs. Patients treated in LTCHs have
consistently higher rates of PAC complications than SNF and IRF patients; these
rates are fairly comparable between patients with and without respiratory failure in
the PAC setting. LTCH patients have lower readmission rates to hospitals than SNF
and IRF patients; average spending following an LTCH stays is much higher than
among SNF and IRF patients.
Superficially, it appears that LTCH produce the worse mortality outcomes among
all patients, those with respiratory failure and those without. However, there are
several potential causes of higher mortality among LTCH patients that are not re-
lated to the care patients receive in LTCHs. Not least of these is that LTCHs may
draw a sicker, higher disease severity set of patients than do SNFs and IRFs. Chap-
5Recall that the analysis sample consists of roughly 10% patients who use SNFs and the universe of
patients who use LTCHs and IRFs for PAC services. Based on the 10% sample, we estimate that a total
of 6,760 and 13,500 patients with and without respiratory failure choose SNFs for the PAC setting. Taking
this into account, about 70% of patients without respiratory failure are treated in SNFs and about 40% of
patients with respiratory failure are treated in SNFs.
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Table 4.10: Complications in PAC Setting, by Respiratory Failure Status
No Respiratory Respiratory Failure
Failure Present
PAC Complications SNF LTCH IRF SNF LTCH IRF
C. Difficile Colitis 0.9% 8.7% 4.1% 0.3% 8.8% 4.2%
Deep Vein Thrombosis 1.1% 5.0% 3.3% 1.6% 4.7% 2.2%
GI Hemorrhage 1.6% 3.3% 1.2% 1.5% 4.2% 1.5%
Pneumonia 7.3% 15.2% 5.5% 6.1% 17.2% 7.5%
Acute Renal Failure 1.2% 5.4% 1.6% 1.5% 6.2% 2.9%
Urinary Tract Infection 2.1% 15.5% 9.5% 3.1% 15.2% 7.3%
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claim files,
2004 POS file
Table 4.11: Readmission and Follow-up Costs following PAC, by Respiratory Failure Status
Respiratory Failure Present Respiratory Failure Absent
SNF LTCH IRF SNF LTCH IRF
Acute Readmission 28% 12% 16% 30% 13% 22%
Acute Readmission: Surgery 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4%
6-month Follow Up
Medicare Spending $145,493 $676,917 $466,341 $130,337 $620,553 $502,528
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient, SNF and other claim files, 2004 POS file
ter 2 of this dissertation compares disease severity measures among LTCH, SNF
and IRF caseloads and found that patients who were discharged to LTCHs longer
acute hospital stays (14 days, compared to 4- 7 days among SNF and IRF patients),
and slightly higher Charlson Comorbidity Index scores (2.15, compared to 1.44 to
2.0 among SNF and IRF patients). To adjust for differential sorting of patients
into LTCHs, SNFs and IRFs along the dimension of disease severity, we control for
observable patient factors and instrument for choice of PAC setting to control for
unobservable factors related to choice of setting. First, results for mortality, PAC
complications, readmission and follow-up cost outcomes are presented for patients
without respiratory failure in the PAC setting. Second, we present regression results
for patients with respiratory failure. To test if substitution potentially confounds
the relationship between patient outcomes and PAC setting, we test whether LTCH
patients have significantly shorter acute hospital length of stay than SNFs and IRFs
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using the same instrumental variables approach used in other models.
4.4.1 Results for Patients without Respiratory Failure in the PAC Setting
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 present results from two sets of regression models for each
measure of mortality, PAC complication, readmission, and follow-up outcomes. The
top panel of each table presents the basic, uninstrumented, linear probability re-
gression results. Each line represents a single regression model where the outcome
variable is regressed upon indicators for LTCH and IRF use, as well as patient char-
acteristics, discharging hospital characteristics, and region. These tables present co-
efficients and standard errors for variables of interest; the full models are presented
in the appendix. The bottom panel presents the two-stage least squares regression
(IV models) results. The first stage models (regressions of LTCH use and IRF use on
differential distance to the nearest LTCH and IRF, as well as the number of SNFs,
LTCHs and IRFs located within 100 miles from each beneficiary, patient and hospi-
tal characteristics, and region) are presented in the appendix. In the second stage
models, LTCH and IRF indicators are the predicted indicators from the first stage
models.
Model results from Table 4.12 suggest that LTCHs produce significantly better
mortality outcomes among patients who do not have respiratory failure in the PAC
setting. The basic linear probability models show that after controlling for observ-
able patient characteristics and other factors, LTCHs’ one-year mortality is about
4 percentage points above the SNF rate. Other LTCH mortality rates cannot be
distinguished from SNF mortality rates. Instrumenting for PAC choice yields signif-
icantly lower mortality in LTCHs than SNFs. SNF patients in this have an observed
one-year mortality rate of 47%; instrumented models suggest that LTCH patient
mortality is lower than comparable SNF patients by 27.7 percentage points. With
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Table 4.12: No Respiratory Failure in PAC: Basic and Instrumented Regression Models
Linear Probability Model Independent Variables
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
1 Year Mortality 0.041 0.019 ** -0.200 0.017 *** 0.0915 7,869
90 Day Mortality 0.017 0.018 -0.178 0.016 *** 0.0737 7,869
60 Day Mortality 0.005 0.017 -0.160 0.015 *** 0.0621 7,869
30 Day Mortality -0.013 0.015 -0.110 0.013 *** 0.0566 7,869
Instrumented Linear Probability Model
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
1 Year Mortality -0.277 0.119 ** -0.362 1.034 0.046 7,612
90 Day Mortality -0.225 0.111 ** 0.111 0.989 0.0188 7,612
60 Day Mortality -0.242 0.108 ** 0.735 0.953 . 7,612
30 Day Mortality -0.216 0.095 ** 0.286 0.828 . 7,612
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
Note: Each line represents a single regression model, where LTCH and IRF
are independent variables.
Note: Full models are presented in the appendix.
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.05
respect to IRFs, the basic linear models suggest that after controlling for patient
observables, IRF patients experience lower mortality than SNF patients. However,
instrumentation does not produce differentiable rates from SNFs.
Observed differences in PAC complication rates among SNF, LTCH and IRF
patients are confirmed in the basic linear models in Table 4.13. These models show
that after controlling for patient observables, LTCH and IRF patients experience
higher rates of many PAC complications than SNF patients. These conditions are
clinically relevant to mechanically ventilated patients and are newly present during
the PAC stay. The IV models produce somewhat mixed results. For C. Difficile
Colitis, Acute Renal Failure, and Urinary Tract Infection, the IV models suggest that
LTCH patients experience higher complication rates than comparable SNF patients.
In all cases, the IV coefficients are larger than the basic linear probability models.
If LTCHs drew patients with relatively high disease severity and a greater risk of
developing these complications, we would expect the IV coefficients to be smaller
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Table 4.13: No Respiratory Failure in PAC: Basic and Instrumented Regression Models
Linear Probability Model Independent Variables
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
C. Difficile Colitis 0.082 0.005 *** 0.036 0.004 *** 0.050 7869
Deep Vein Thrombosis 0.042 0.004 *** 0.026 0.004 *** 0.029 7869
GI Hemorrhage 0.014 0.006 ** -0.005 0.005 0.028 7869
Pneumonia 0.081 0.010 *** -0.014 0.009 0.041 7869
Acute Renal Failure 0.043 0.005 *** 0.008 0.004 ** 0.024 7869
Urinary Tract Infection 0.125 0.008 *** 0.070 0.007 *** 0.079 7869
Instrumented Linear Probability Model
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
C. Difficile Colitis 0.111 0.029 *** 0.036 0.157 0.045 7612
Deep Vein Thrombosis 0.013 0.031 0.510 0.268 * . 7612
GI Hemorrhage 0.011 0.024 -0.417 0.255 . 7612
Pneumonia 0.184 0.068 -0.522 0.584 . 7612
Acute Renal Failure 0.053 0.020 *** -0.234 0.161 . 7612
Urinary Tract Infection 0.132 0.031 *** -0.149 0.262 0.027 7612
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
Note: Each line represents a single regression model, where LTCH and IRF
are independent variables.
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.05; * p-value <0.10
Table 4.14: No Respiratory Failure in PAC: Basic and Instrumented Regression Models
Linear Probability Model Independent Variables
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
Acute Readmission -0.183 0.017 *** -0.136 0.016 *** 0.066 7,869
Acute Readmission: Surgery 0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.007 0.046 7,869
Log Medicare Spending 1.758 0.267 *** 3.623 0.235 *** 0.1122 4,623
Instrumented Linear Probability Model
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err R-Sqrd N
Acute Readmission -0.235 0.111 ** -1.916 0.957 ** . 7,612
Acute Readmission: Surgery 0.029 0.032 -0.601 0.390 . 7,612
Log Medicare Spending 2.51 1.71 5.51 11.67 0.106 4,623
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
Note: Each line represents a single regression model, where LTCH and IRF
are independent variables.
Note: Full models are presented in the appendix.
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.05
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than coefficients in the basic linear model. Consequently, it appears that LTCHs
do not draw patients with higher underlying risk for these complications. For other
conditions, the IV models are inconclusive as to whether LTCH patients experience
different rates of complications than SNF patients. Only for Deep Vein Thrombosis
do IRF patients experience significantly higher complication rates than SNF patients.
For other conditions related to mechanical ventilation, the models are inconclusive.
We conduct analogous two-stage least squares regression analysis to test whether
LTCH patients have fewer readmission to hospitals for any reason and for surgery
(using the surgery DRGs to indicate whether a patient had surgery during a hospital
stay). We find that, following PAC stays, LTCH and IRF patients have significantly
fewer readmission to hospitals for any reason, but not significantly fewer readmissions
for surgery than comparable SNF patients. In addition, although LTCH and IRF
patients had much higher follow-up spending following their PAC stay, the IV results
suggests that spending is not conclusively different than spending by SNF patients.
These outcomes are meant to offer a sense of the economic outcomes of LTCH and
IRF care compared to SNF care. Unfortunately, they are not very conclusive. It is not
surprising that LTCHs care is less often followed by acute readmission; as accredited
hospitals, LTCHs and IRFs are designed to address many of their patients health
needs and would be capable treating emergent conditions.
4.4.2 Results for Patients with Respiratory Failure in the PAC Setting
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 present the basic and two-stage least squares mortality and
complications results for patients with respiratory failure reported during the PAC
stay. The mortality results are quite divergent from patterns among patients who
do not have respiratory failure reported during the PAC stay. Unlike those results,
the IV models suggest that LTCH patients experience higher mortality rates than
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Table 4.15: Respiratory Failure Present in PAC: Basic and Instrumented Regression Models
Linear Probability Model Independent Variables
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
1 Year Mortality 0.154 0.021 *** -0.134 0.025 *** 0.113 10,321
90 Day Mortality 0.124 0.019 *** -0.105 0.022 *** 0.097 10,321
60 Day Mortality 0.102 0.018 *** -0.078 0.021 *** 0.070 10,321
30 Day Mortality 0.043 0.016 ** -0.045 0.018 ** 0.037 10,321
Instrumented Linear Probability Model
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
1 Year Mortality 0.287 0.069 *** -1.256 1.387 . 10,168
90 Day Mortality 0.200 0.064 ** -0.380 1.336 0.084 10,168
60 Day Mortality 0.210 0.061 *** 0.192 1.305 0.054 10,168
30 Day Mortality 0.227 0.052 *** 1.452 1.260 . 10,168
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
Note: Each line represents a single regression model, where LTCH and IRF
are independent variables.
Note: Full models are presented in the appendix.
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.05
SNF patients. For example, one-year mortality among SNF patients is 52%. The
IV models suggest that the LTCH mortality rate is 28.7 percentage points above the
rate of comparable SNF patients.
Results for PAC complications follow roughly the same pattern as found among
patients without respiratory failure. That is, the basic linear models confirm higher
observed rates of many complications among LTCH and IRF patients than SNF
patients with positive and significant coefficients. The IV results are again mixed:
for several conditions, the IV results suggest that the LTCH and IRF complication
rates cannot be distinguished from SNF rates; in other words, instrumenting does not
give a conclusive answer as whether LTCHs and IRFs produce different complication
rates than SNFs. But, for a few conditions (Pneumonia, Acute Renal Failure, and
Urinary Tract Infection) LTCH patients experience higher complication rates than
comparable SNF patients.
The divergent patterns in mortality between patients with and without respira-
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Table 4.16: Respiratory Failure Present in PAC: Uninstrumented and Instrumented Regression
Models
Linear Probability Model Independent Variables
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
C. Difficile Colitis 0.084 0.005 *** 0.037 0.007 *** 0.050 10,321
Deep Vein Thrombosis 0.022 0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.022 10,321
GI Hemorrhage 0.028 0.006 *** 0.004 0.006 0.023 10,321
Pneumonia 0.101 0.011 *** 0.012 0.014 0.045 10,321
Acute Renal Failure 0.047 0.005 *** 0.016 0.007 ** 0.025 10,321
Urinary Tract Infection 0.118 0.008 *** 0.042 0.011 *** 0.061 10,321
Instrumented Linear Probability Model
LTCH IRF Model Fit
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err R-Sqrd N
C. Difficile Colitis 0.085 0.011 0.115 0.198 0.047 10,168
Deep Vein Thrombosis 0.015 0.019 -0.247 0.393 . 10,168
GI Hemorrhage 0.004 0.017 0.369 0.392 . 10,168
Pneumonia 0.169 0.041 *** 0.484 0.605 . 10,168
Acute Renal Failure 0.038 0.013 *** -0.337 0.272 . 10,168
Urinary Tract Infection 0.099 0.024 *** -0.317 0.509 0.030 10,168
Source: 2004 Medicare Denominator, Inpatient and SNF claims, 2004 POS file.
Note: Each line represents a single regression model, where LTCH and IRF
are independent variables.
Note: Control variables (patient characteristics and discharging hospital
characteristics) presented in appendix.
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.05; * p-value <0.10
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tory failure suggest that instrumentation does not perfectly correct for differential
sorting into PAC settings among patients with respiratory failure reported in their
PAC claims. Its seems unlikely that LTCHs would produce significantly better mor-
tality outcomes among patients without respiratory failure, but perform worse among
patients with greater disease severity when LTCHs are designed specifically to treat
high disease severity patients with complex medical conditions. As such, this analysis
is not able to make strong conclusions about how LTCH care compares to care pro-
vided by other PAC providers. We are left with a puzzle regarding the value of LTCH
care for mechanically ventilated patients. On one hand, patients who have higher
disease severity or are less likely to recover (in ways that are not directly observable in
the claims data) may systematically sort into LTCHs, driving the differential results
among respiratory failure patients. On the other hand, it is possible that LTCHs
play a fundamentally different role in treating respiratory failure patients compared
to SNFs and IRFs than they do in treating patients without respiratory failure. In
either case, it is difficult to draw causal inferences about the value of LTCH care for
either group.
Sensitivity analysis (results not presented), using a proxy for whether patients are
weaned from the ventilator at acute hospital discharge (using ICU and total length
of stay, and ventilation procedure dates), revealed the same patterns in mortality
in patients with and without respiratory failure (among patients who appear to
not be ventilated during the PAC stay). Regression results among patients who
appear to be ventilated during the PAC stay are not precisely estimated to draw
conclusions. These results suggest that the mystery of how LTCH care compares to
other PAC settings might be better understood by examining differences between
patients with and without respiratory failure, understanding the clinical sequelae of
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the medical condition, patient characteristics related to choice of PAC setting, as
well as differences in treatment across PAC settings.
4.5 Conclusion
Long-Term Care Hospitals are paid substantially more to treat patients following
acute hospital stays than are SNFs and IRFs. Differences in payment rates for treat-
ing apparently similar patients may reflect a number of factors, including differences
in treatment regimen, labor and other inputs devoted to patient care, and the cost of
those inputs. However, by maintaining separate payment systems for SNFs, LTCHs
and IRFs, the Medicare program runs the risk of paying providers vastly different
amounts to provide very similar treatment to similar patients. The risk of ineffi-
ciency in PAC payment systems was highlighted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
In that analysis, we found that LTCH patient caseloads are much more similar to
the caseloads of SNFs and IRFs than previously thought. Although treatment was
found to be more medically intense than treatment provided by SNFs and IRFs,
the differences do not seem substantial enough to fully explain the difference in pay-
ment that we observed for patients who received mechanical ventilation during their
acute hospital stay. For patients in DRG 475 and 483 during the acute hospital stay,
LTCHs receive between $31,000 and $45,000 more than SNFs for treating the same
class of patients.
This study examined differences in patient health and cost outcomes of care pro-
vided in SNFs, LTCHs, and IRFs to test whether LTCHs, being paid substantially
more than other providers, were able to produce better health outcomes. The answer
to our research question is not an unequivocal yes.
We found that among patients without respiratory failure during their PAC stay,
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LTCHs appear to achieve substantially lower mortality than among comparable SNF
patients. However, the rates of some PAC complications are higher among LTCH
patients than SNF patients. However, because the results for patients with respi-
ratory failure are large and statistically significant, but counterintuitive, we do not
conclude that there is a causal link between treatment setting and patient outcomes
for either group.
Further studies would do well to investigate the relationship between respiratory
failure and treatment and outcomes across PAC settings. In addition, future study
should concentrate on differences in payments to acute care hospitals and LTCHs to
better understand how payment for the whole episode compares across patients.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the market behavior of Long-
Term Care Hospitals (LTCHs), to examine payment system incentives impact LTCHs
treatment decisions, and to measure the extent of substitution, and the quality of
substitution between LTCHs and other PAC providers. This work focused on a few
specific questions. First, are LTCHs more similar to conventional post-acute care
(PAC) providers in their patient caseloads and practices; and can local market char-
acteristics explain LTCHs uneven geographical distribution? Second, to what extent
does LTCHs eligibility criterion (that they must maintain length of stay averages
above 25 days) affect their practice patterns under prospective payment? Finally,
how well do SNFs, LTCHs and IRFs substitute for each other in the care of mechan-
ically ventilated patients?
The major findings of this work are the following. First, LTCHs are fairly sim-
ilar to conventional PAC providers like SNFs and IRFs. LTCH care appears to be
substituted for hospital-based PAC, and LTCH caseloads and practices are not un-
like these other providers. Moreover, LTCHs tend to be located in areas that may
be underserved by other providers of relatively intense PAC. Like other health care
providers, LTCHs appear to favor areas that appear to have a higher propensity
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to use acute and post-acute services. Second, also like other health care providers,
LTCHs respond strongly to changes in financial incentives, and appear to protect
their financial well-being. Finally, although the Medicare program risks inefficiency
in their PAC payment systems by allowing payment to vary across payment systems
for essentially the same care, it does appear that paying LTCHs more than other
providers supports better outcomes. This might not be the case across the board,
but at least for this set of patients, differential payment does not appear inefficient.
The common goal among these three separate analyses was to consider LTCHs
within the larger contexts of post-acute care, of intricate systems of financial incen-
tives, and of health care markets. To this end, the analysis has revealed some impor-
tant lessons about how policy can shape the future of the LTCH industry. Similarity
between LTCHs and hospital-based PAC providers calls into question Medicare’s
practice of reimbursing, regulating and covering services along the same dimension.
Currently, all LTCHs, all SNFs, and all IRFs face the same coverage and reimburse-
ment rules. Fairness and equity dictate that classes of providers that treat similar
sets of patients, provide similar treatment and produce comparable patient outcomes,
ought to be treated similarly. That LTCHs are more similar to, and appear to sub-
stitute for hospital-based SNFs and IRFs suggests that payment could be calibrated
within this set of providers. Calibration of payment rates should not ignore the spe-
cific clinical benefits of receiving care in LTCHs, hospital-based SNFs or IRFs for
particular patient groups.
Growth and clustering of LTCHs in metropolitan areas also has implications for
Medicare’s governance of payment to LTCHs. Findings from Chapter 3 suggest that
the 25-day eligibility criterion for LTCHs is probably not too strict. The eligibility
criterion is a policy tool that can be used to protect access to LTCH care for the
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most resource-needy patients. Requiring that LTCHs provide stays lasting at least
25 days on average may counteract the forces of competition among LTCHs, as well
as the financial incentive inherent to prospective payment to admit patients with
relatively low resource needs. As LTCHs grow, and cluster in areas with greater
propensity to use acute and post-acute services, the eligibility criterion will continue
to be an important tool to protect the integrity of Medicare’s LTCH benefit. Other
policy tools are available to Medicare, including using patient criteria to limit LTCH
admissions among patients who could be more appropriately treated in other types of
PAC settings. This may slow the growth of LTCHs in some areas, and, potentially,
indirectly encourage new LTCHs to locate in communities that are not currently
served.
This dissertation has also reveals directions for future research in post-acute care.
First, it is important to understand how the value of LTCH care compares to care
provided in other settings for a broader set of patients. This work focused specifically
on the set of patients that LTCHs are best known for, but these patients do not
represent the full population served by LTCHs. Second, further attention should
be given to measuring the substitutability of LTCH and acute hospital care. The
instrumental variables approach used in Chapter 4 was not able to fully capture this
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Table A.1: Length of Stay Models: Full Models
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
PPS -9.10 2.99 ** -5.69 2.05 **
Middle Group -13.07 3.76 ** -10.71 3.02 ***
Middle Group x PPS 8.89 3.51 * 4.14 2.22 *
Low Group -16.03 4.62 * -13.33 3.81 **
Low Group x PPS 11.15 3.91 ** 5.78 2.72 *
Fiscal Month -0.13 0.05 ** -0.44 0.17 **
Middle Group x Fiscal Month 0.43 0.19 *
Low Group x Fiscal Month 0.49 0.25 *
LTCH For-Profit -1.17 1.53 -1.14 1.52
LTCH Age Cohort: Before 10/1983 3.98 4.21 3.95 4.21
LTCH Age Cohort: 10/1983-1993 -1.01 1.86 -1.01 1.86
LTCH No. of Beds 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Patient Age -0.07 0.03 * -0.07 0.03 *
Patient Sex: Male 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.41
No. of Major Diagnostic Categories -3.97 0.93 *** -3.96 0.93 ***
1 Nervous System 6.34 1.05 *** 6.32 1.04 ***
2 Eye 7.06 4.83 7.04 4.83
3 Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat 4.05 0.79 *** 4.04 0.79 ***
4 Respiratory System 6.16 0.82 *** 6.14 0.82 ***
6 Digestive System 6.22 1.10 *** 6.22 1.09 ***
7 Hepatobiliary Sys. & Pancreas -0.52 1.32 -0.54 1.32
8
Musculoskeletal System and
Connective Tissue 3.09 0.79 *** 3.09 0.79 ***
9 Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue & Breast 9.27 0.69 *** 9.26 0.69 ***
10
Endocrine, Nutritional, &
Metabolic System 2.94 0.59 *** 2.93 0.59 ***
11 Kidney & Urinary Tract 6.42 0.74 *** 6.41 0.74 ***
12&13 Reproductive System 1.76 0.84 * 1.75 0.84 *
16
Blood, Blood Forming Organs, &
Immunological Disorders 3.75 0.95 *** 3.73 0.95 ***
17
Myeloproliferative & Poorly
Differentiated Disorders -1.39 0.96 -1.42 0.97
18 Infectious & Parasitic Diseases 6.95 0.69 *** 6.94 0.69 ***
19 Mental Diseases & Disorders 3.87 1.71 * 3.86 1.71 *
20
Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced
Mental Disorders 1.58 1.04 1.58 1.04
21
Injuries, Poison, & Toxic Effect of
Drugs 7.46 0.77 *** 7.44 0.77 ***
22 Burns 4.48 2.06 * 4.46 2.06 *
23 Factors Influencing Health Status 1.55 0.73 * 1.53 0.73 *
25 HIV Infection 0.59 7.79 0.52 7.79
Constant 40.68 5.69 *** 39.01 5.32 ***
Observations 154,555 154,555
F-Statistic 49.85 46.84
Pr > F 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.03 0.03
Source: 2001-2003 MedPAR, 2004 Medicare Claims, 2004 POS file
*** p-value < 0.000, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.10
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Table B.1: First Stage Regression Models: Full Models
Respiratory Failure Absent
Dependent Variables
Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept 0.46 0.06 *** 0.22 0.02 ***
Log DD to LTCH -0.05 0.01 *** 0.01 0.00 **
Log DD to IRF 0.02 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 *
No. SNFs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
No. LTCHs/100 miles 0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
No. IRFs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Age 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
Patient Sex: Male 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Race: Black -0.04 0.01 ** -0.01 0.00 **
Race: Hispanic -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.01 *
Race: Other -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
Region: Northeast -0.07 0.02 *** -0.02 0.01 *
Region: Midwest -0.07 0.02 *** -0.03 0.01 ***
Region: West 0.04 0.02 * 0.00 0.01
Current MCR Entitlement: DI -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 *
Current MCR Entitlement: ESRD -0.22 0.09 * -0.09 0.03 **
Orig. MCR Entitlement: DI -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 ***
Orig. MCR Entitlement: ESRD 0.23 0.09 * 0.07 0.04
Charlson Comorbidity Score 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 **
Nervous System 0.09 0.02 *** 0.01 0.01
Eye 0.04 0.02 0.91 0.01 ***
Ear, Nose, Mouth and Throat 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.02
Circulatory System 0.19 0.02 *** 0.01 0.01 *
Digestive System 0.24 0.03 *** 0.02 0.01 *
Hepatobiliary Sys and Pancreas 0.20 0.10 * 0.02 0.03
Musc. Sys and Connective Tissue 0.26 0.05 *** 0.04 0.02 **
Skin, Subcut. Tissue and Breast 0.16 0.09 -0.02 0.02
Endocrine, Nut. and Metabolic Sys 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.01
Kidney and Urinary Tract 0.11 0.04 ** -0.02 0.01
Reproductive System 0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.03
Blood, Bld Form. Organs & Immun. Dis. 0.26 0.12 * 0.06 0.04
Myeloproliferative and Poorly Diff. Dis -0.12 0.05 ** -0.02 0.04
Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 0.04 0.02 * -0.01 0.01
Mental D & D 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02
Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced Mental Dis 0.86 0.06 -0.06 0.02 ***
Injuries, Poison, and Toxic Effect of Drugs 0.16 0.06 ** 0.03 0.02
Burns 0.27 0.21 0.03 0.06
Factors Inflncng Health Status 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01
HIV 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.06
Note: Regression results continued on the next page.
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Table B.2: First Stage Regression Models: Full Models, Continued
Respiratory Failure Absent
Dependent Variables
Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
ARDS: comorbid -0.06 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00
Cardiac Arrest: comorbid 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.03
Clostridium Difficile Colitis: comorbid -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Stroke/Intrcrnl Hemorrhage: comorbid 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 *
Deep Vein Thrombosis: comorbid 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ileus Gastroparesis 0.06 0.16 -0.03 0.04
GI Hemorrhage: comorbid -0.04 0.02 * 0.00 0.01
Hypotension: comorbid 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02 **
Pulmonary Embolism: comorbid -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02
Pleural Effusion: comorbid 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Pneumothorax: comorbid 0.08 0.04 * 0.02 0.01
Pneumonia: comorbid -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Renal Failure/Insuff: comorbid 0.04 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00
Sepsis with Shock: cormorbid 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
UTI: comorbid -0.03 0.01 ** -0.02 0.00 ***
Hospital has LTC Unit -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hospital has Rehab Unit 0.03 0.01 ** 0.03 0.00 ***
Hospital has SNF Unit -0.05 0.01 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Hospital is Swing Bed -0.08 0.03 ** -0.01 0.01
Hospital: For-Profit 0.06 0.02 ** 0.02 0.01 **
Hospital: Government -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
No. of Residents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of Beds 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Stat 40.04 4.50
Pr >F 0.00 0.00
N 7,612 7,612
Source: 2004 Denominator file, Claims file, 2004 POS file.
*** p-value < 0.000, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05
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Table B.3: First Stage Regression Models: Full Models
Respiratory Failure Present
Dependent Variables
Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Intercept -0.08 0.01 *** 0.07 0.01 ***
Log DD to LTCH 0.03 0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
Log DD to IRF 0.00 0.00 ** -0.01 0.00 ***
No. SNFs/100 miles 0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
No. LTCHs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
No. IRFs/100 miles 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Age -0.03 0.02 ** 0.00 0.00 ***
Patient Sex: Male 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Race: Black 0.12 0.05 -0.01 0.00 ***
Race: Hispanic -0.01 0.04 * 0.00 0.00
Race: Other -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00
Region: Northeast 0.05 0.03 *** 0.01 0.00 *
Region: Midwest 0.01 0.03 * -0.01 0.00 *
Region: West -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.00 *
Current MCR Entitlement: DI -0.16 0.20 0.00 0.00
Current MCR Entitlement: ESRD 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Orig. MCR Entitlement: DI 0.11 0.21 -0.01 0.00 ***
Orig. MCR Entitlement: ESRD -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 ***
Charlson Comorbidity Score 0.22 0.04 ** 0.00 0.00
Nervous System 0.43 0.07 *** 0.00 0.00
Eye 0.35 0.11 *** -0.04 0.01 **
Ear, Nose, Mouth and Throat 0.20 0.03 ** 0.00 0.02
Circulatory System 0.28 0.04 *** 0.00 0.00
Digestive System 0.28 0.10 *** -0.01 0.00 *
Hepatobiliary Sys and Pancreas 0.25 0.07 ** -0.02 0.01
Musc. Sys and Connective Tissue 0.21 0.15 *** 0.01 0.01
Skin, Subcut. Tissue and Breast 0.28 0.07 0.00 0.01
Endocrine, Nut. and Metabolic System 0.12 0.06 *** -0.01 0.00
Kidney and Urinary Tract 0.46 0.03 *** -0.01 0.00 ***
Reproductive System 0.24 0.18 -0.02 0.00 ***
Blood and Blood For. Organs and
Immun. Dis. -0.06 0.17 *** -0.03 0.00 ***
Myeloproliferative and Poorly Diff. Dis 0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.01 ***
Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 0.48 0.04 -0.01 0.00 **
Mental Diseases and Disorders -0.20 0.12 *** 0.00 0.02
Alcohol/Drug Use or Induced Mental
Disorders 0.29 0.09 0.03 0.05
Injuries, Poison, and Toxic Effect of
Drugs -0.07 0.23 ** 0.00 0.01
Burns 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.02
Factors Influencing Health Status 0.55 0.15 0.00 0.01
HIV -0.03 0.02 *** -0.03 0.01 **
Note: Regression results continued on the next page.
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Table B.4: First Stage Regression Models: Full Models, Continued
Respiratory Failure Present
Dependent Variables
Use LTCH Use IRF
Independent Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
ARDS: comorbid 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Cardiac Arrest: comorbid 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.01
Clostridium Difficile Colitis: comorbid 0.11 0.04 * 0.00 0.00
Stroke/Intrcrnl Hemorrhage: comorbid -0.03 0.04 ** 0.00 0.00
Deep Vein Thrombosis: comorbid -0.07 0.13 0.00 0.00
Ileus Gastroparesis 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01
GI Hemorrhage: comorbid 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00
Hypotension: comorbid 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.01 *
Pulmonary Embolism: comorbid 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.01
Pleural Effusion: comorbid 0.14 0.05 *** 0.01 0.00 *
Pneumothorax: comorbid 0.00 0.02 ** 0.00 0.00
Pneumonia: comorbid 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Renal Failure/Insuff: comorbid 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00
Sepsis with Shock: cormorbid -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 *
UTI: comorbid -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 **
Hospital has LTC Unit 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
Hospital has Rehab Unit -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00
Hospital has SNF Unit -0.10 0.08 ** -0.01 0.00 ***
Hospital is Swing Bed 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
Hospital: For-Profit -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
Hospital: Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of Residents 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00




Source: 2004 Denominator file, Claims file, 2004 POS file.
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